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SUBSTANTIAL CONNECTION AND THE ILLUSIVE
FACILITATION ELEMENT FOR CIVIL FORFEITURE OF
NARCOBAND IN DRUG FELONY CASES*
I. INTRODUCTION
When Stanford Bradshaw returned home from the mall, Halifax
County, Virginia, police officers arrested him for possession of cocaine. A
subsequent search of his residence produced forty-nine grams of cocaine,
a set of scales and a little over $17,000 in cash stuffed in a bank bag.
Bradshaw was a cocaine addict who occasionally sold drugs from his
house. Although he knew he had committed a serious crime, Bradshaw
did not imagine the ultimate consequence of his criminal activity. The
Commonwealth's Attorney seized Bradshaw's house and instituted forfei-
ture proceedings:1 the most powerful weapon in its arsenal. 2 As a result of
his drug dealing, Bradshaw faced the loss of all rights, title, and interest
in his house as well as its interior furniture.
John Greenbacker, the Commonwealth's Attorney in the Bradshaw
case, confronted several uncertainties. Since this was the first time the
facilitation provision of the civil forfeiture statute was at issue, the Com-
monwealth had no leading cases. Greenbacker had no guide for the
amount of evidence he needed to put on to win the case. He only knew
that he was required to prove that Bradshaw's house was "used in sub-
stantial connection" with the illegal distribution of drugs. He had to
prove Bradshaw's property "facilitated" a drug deal. Greenbacker grap-
pled with the same dilemma as attorneys across the country: What was
the appropriate standard for the "facilitation" element in drug felony
civil forfeiture cases? The awesome scope and power of civil forfeiture
made the lack of direction on this important aspect of the Bradshaw case
frightening.
A. Substantive Facilitation Definition Needed
The dilemma facing Commonwealth Attorney Greenbacker, not sur-
prisingly, has led courts to disfavor civil forfeiture law.3 In 1980, Judge
* The author gratefully acknowledges Professor John Paul Jones and Olivia L. Norman
for their deft and patient editing of this Note.
1. Commonwealth v. Bradshaw (Halifax County Cir. Ct. Feb. 13, 1989) (Matthews, J.,
presiding;, no docket number), appeal withdrawn, No. 0941-89-2 (Va. App. Jan. 24, 1990);
Commonwealth v. Real Property & Furnishings located at 1402 Irish St., South Boston, Va.,
No. CL58-7836 (Halifax County Cir. Ct. Mar. 6, 1990) (McCormick, J., presiding).
2. See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 26 (1983).
3. United States v. One 1981 Cadillac Eldorado, 535 F. Supp. 65 (N.D. IlM. 1982). One
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Edward Dumbauld stated "in many cases forfeiture is a harsh and op-
pressive procedure. . . ."I He concluded that many aspects preserved in
the modern law of forfeiture constitute vestiges of "old, forgotten, far-off
things and battles long ago. ' 5
Nothing about the course of the civil forfeiture juggernaut is more ob-
fuscated than the rule of law relating to the concept of "facilitation." The
government must prove that the narcobands was "used in any manner to
facilitate" an illegal drug transaction. The meaning of "facilitation,"
therefore, is central to the government's burden of proof. Judicial inter-
pretation, however, has done little to clarify the illusive standard. Courts
are currently split regarding proper interpretation of the "facilitation"
concept.7 This split among the circuits reverberates throughout the fed-
eral and state judiciary. The United States Supreme Court has refused to
certify civil forfeiture cases8 and has yet to define the "facilitation" ele-
ment. Without a Supreme Court standard, the circuit courts continue to
decide cases interpreting facilitation in polar opposition to one another.9
Federal civil forfeiture of narcoband is governed by the provisions of 21
commentator called federal civil forfeiture an "ill-conceived" plan. Note, Federal Civil For-
feiture: An Ill-Conceived Scheme Unfairly Deprives an Innocent Party of its Property In-
terest, 6 U. DET. L. REV. 87 (1984).
4. United States v. One 1976 Mercedes-Benz 280S, 618 F.2d 453, 454 (7th Cir. 1980).
5. Id. at 461.
6. Narcoband is property in which a person has a pre-existing legitimate interest at the
time that it is used in, or is related to his illegal conduct. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson
Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 668 (1974). This term describes all forms of property, but
it is limited to legitimate pre-existing property interests used in the commission of a crimi-
nal offense. It may encompass the instrumentalities and proceeds of crime, United States v.
Russello, 464 U.S. 16 (1983), as well as tainted property used to pay legitimate expenses,
such as food, shelter, medical and attorney's fees. United States v. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct.
2657 (1989) (citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987)).
However, this term does not include contraband, One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylva-
nia, 380 U.S. 693 (1965), which the government may seize, and which is summarily forfeita-
ble under such statutes as The Contraband Seizure Act, 49 U.S.C. § 782 (1988) because the
law does not recognize a right to possess it, i.e., cocaine, or stolen money. Property used for
transportation of contraband or facilitation of drug deals is narcoband unless it is wholly
derived from contraband. See United States v. One 1976 Porsche 911S, 670 F.2d 810 (9th
Cir. 1979). For instance, a car purchased with stolen money and which is subsequently used
in connection with a drug transaction would not be narcoband.
7. United States v. One Parcel of Real Property, 712 F. Supp. 810, 812-13 (D. Or. 1989).
8. See, e.g., United States v. $228,536.00 in U.S. Currency, 895 F.2d 908, 916 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2564 (1990).
9. To illustrate this point, compare United States v. All Right, Title & Interest in Real
Property & Appurtenances Known as 288-290 North St., Middleton, N.Y., 743 F. Supp.
1068 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (the intent of the forfeiture provision, section 881, is to seize all prop-
erty that has a "substantial connection" to the illegal drug activity) (quoting Feldman v.
Perrill, 902 F.2d 1445 (9th Cir. 1990)) with United States v. All Right, Title & Interest in
Property & Premises Known as 710 Main St., Peekskill, N.Y., 744 F. Supp. 510 (S.D.N.Y.
1990) (the government need not establish a substantial connection between the criminal
activity and the property; the government need only show a "sufficient nexus").
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U.S.C. section 881 ("section 881").10 The federal scheme, more or less, is
emulated in the fifty states.1 Section 881 subjects to forfeiture narcoband
that is "used in any manner to facilitate" an illegal drug transaction. 2 In
United States v. One Parcel of Real Estate Commonly Known as 916
Douglas Avenue, Elgin, Illinois," the Seventh Circuit stated "Congress
intended to reach all real property used to promote the drug trade. [Sec-
tion 881] is a broad sweeping amendment which grants wide powers to
the executive branch for the limited purpose of combating the flow of
illegal drugs."' 4
This Note demonstrates that forfeiture powers under Section 881 are
not so "broad" and "sweeping" as to be virtually unlimited in scope, as
the Seventh Circuit asserts. Property should be regarded as forfeitable
under the common scheme of federal and state drug enforcement statutes
only where the government can prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that the narcoband was used in "substantial connection" with the illegal
manufacture, sale, or distribution of a controlled substance.15 Courts
should define the limitation of "substantial connection" as the routine,
repeated, and intentional use of the narcoband to conduct the illegal
manufacture, sale, distribution of a controlled substance. The issue of
what constitutes the most appropriate definition of the facilitation ele-
ment should turn on the definition of "substantial connection."
After a detailed review of the widely varying standards applied across
the circuits, this Note examines the legislative history and shows that
Congress intended for the "substantial connection" standard to apply to
these sensitive cases. This Note outlines reasons why courts should apply
the "substantial connection" standard based on traditional canons of
statutory interpretation. In addition, precedent supports the "substantial
connection" standard for facilitation in federal civil forfeiture cases. This
Note demonstrates how this standard for "facilitation" can ensure judi-
cial consistency by properly balancing the competing interests of the gov-
ernment and of the private citizen, and thus, allow citizens to reasonably
10. 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988).
11. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-386 (Cum. Supp. 1990).
12. "Given the language of [section 881] and the determination of Congress to punish
drug traffickers harshly, there is no reason for courts to go out of their way to restrict the
scope of forfeiture." Comment, The Scope of Real Property Forfeiture for Drug-Related
Crime Under the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 303, 327 (1988). This
Note disputes such a contention.
13. United States v. One Parcel of Real Estate Commonly Known as 916 Douglas Ave.,
Elgin, Ill., 903 F.2d 490 (7th Cir. 1990).
14. Id. at 493.
15. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-386.10. (1990); United States v. $22,287.00 in U.S.
Currency, 709 F.2d 442 (6th Cir. 1983). Accord United States v. 1966 Beechcraft Aircraft
Model King Air, 777 F.2d 947 (4th Cir. 1985); Smith v. Commonwealth, 707 S.W.2d 342 (Ky.
1986) (acquittal on trafficking charge sufficient to rebut presumption that $2,000.00 found
on defendant was used to facilitate an illegal drug transaction).
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conform their behavior to the laws.
B. The Utility of the "Substantial Connection" Standard
The "substantial connection" standard is a bright-line test allowing
courts to fully and fairly adjudicate forfeiture actions. A overview of the
mechanics of federal and state processes, showing how civil forfeiture dif-
fers from criminal forfeiture, demonstrates how the important substan-
tive concept of "facilitation" interfaces with "substantial connection."
1. Substantive Law
Two types of forfeiture exist in modern law: criminal and civil. Civil
forfeiture is a statutory,1 6 in rem action, 17 reflecting the legal fiction that
the property itself is the defendant.'8 By contrast, criminal forfeiture is
an in personam action against the criminal defendant. 9
a. Deodand and Drug Traffic
The logical origin of the fiction that the property is the defendant
probably is deodand. Justice Holmes quoted one medieval writer regard-
ing deodand: "[W]here a man killeth another with the sword of John at
Stile, the sword shall forfeit as deodand, and yet no default is in the
owner."20 Derived from the Latin Deo Dandum, the term literally means
"to be given to God."'" Deodand dates back as far as biblical scripture,
where it is written in Exodus 21:28 that if "an ox gore a man or a woman,
and they die, [it] shall be stoned: and his flesh shall not be eaten. ' '2' The
practice of deodand, thus, was a sort of "religious expiation."'23
Deodand exemplified the origins of a forfeiture doctrine that touched
all aspects of English culture.' 4 When the religious and eleemosynary pur-
16. C.J. Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U.S. 133, 137-38 (1943).
17. United States v. $280,505.00 in U.S. Currency, 655 F. Supp. 1487 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
18. United States v. $152,160.00 in U.S. Currency, 680 F. Supp. 354 (D. Colo. 1988);
United States v. One Mercedes-Benz 380 SEL, 604 F. Supp. 1307 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 762
F.2d 991 (2d Cir. 1985). For a case that stretches this legal invention to the limits, see
Dobbins Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395 (1878).
19. United States v. Rosenfield, 651 F. Supp. 211 (E.D. Pa. 1986); United States v. Con-
ner, 752 F.2d 566 (11th Cir. 1985). Criminal forfeiture, whose roots are medieval, is rela-
tively new to American law. United States v. Nichols, 841 F.2d 1485, 1487 (10th Cir. 1988).
Unlike its civil counterpart, a special verdict of forfeiture must be returned by the jury in a
criminal proceeding. As a form of punishment , it has practically been unknown in this
country.
20. 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 23 (M. Howe ed. 1963).
21. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 436 (6th ed. 1990).
22. Exodus 21:28.
23. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 681 (1974).
24. Finkelstein, The Goring Ox: Some Historical Perspectives on Deodands, Forfeitures,
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poses of deodand ceased, the Crown justified the institution as a form of
civil punitive damages. 25 Though deodand seems to survive in an adulter-
ated form in the modern law of civil forfeiture, most commentators be-
lieve that religious or charitable aspects of forfeiture have been lost in
American common law.26 The principle of deodand is alive and well; an
unreported Virginia circuit court case required forfeiture of a gun for kill-
ing a deer.
27
Today, public policy replaces deodand in support of civil forfeiture.
Forfeiture seeks not only to punish, as the United States Supreme Court
noted in Russello v. United States,28 but "to remove the profit from or-
ganized crime by separating the racketeer from his dishonest gains. '29
Consistent with a strong public policy which endorses hitting the drug
trade "where it hurts" and stripping organized crime of its instrumentali-
ties,30 civil forfeiture imposes economic penalties on drug dealers,31 ac-
counting for its wide use.3 2 Civil forfeiture statutes date from the colonial
period33 and continue to be enacted into the modern age.3 4 Today, civil
forfeiture figures prominently in governmental efforts to fight drugs.
Wrongful Death and the Western Notion of Sovereignty, 46 TEMIP. L.Q. 169 (1973).
25. 1 M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN, 419 (1st Am. ed. 1847).
26. Parker-Harris Co. v. Tate, 135 Tenn. 509, -, 188 S.W. 54, 55 (1916).
27. See Va. Law Weekly, Nov. 6, 1989, at 409 (Case No. 89-K-129).
28. 464 U.S. 16, 27-28 (1983).
29. Id.; see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1988); 21 U.S.C. § 853 (1988).
30. United States v. Premises Known as 2639 Meetinghouse Rd., 633 F. Supp. 979, 994
(E.D. Pa. 1986); 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmIN. NEws 3182, 3374 (profit is the sole motiva-
tion for the drug trade, and it is profit that. sustains the economic power base of the criminal
enterprise).
31. In Caplan & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2667 (1989), Justice
White stated:
[The government has a pecuniary interest in forfeiture that goes beyond merely sep-
arating a criminal from his ill-gotten gains; that legitimate interest extends to recov-
ering all forfeitable assets, for such assets are deposited in a fund that supports law
enforcement efforts... The sums of money that can be raised for law enforcement
activities this way are substantial and the government's interest in using the profits
of crime to fund these activities should not be discounted.
Id. at 2677.
Though criminal forfeiture statutes are designed to raise revenue, the Virginia State
Crime Commission estimates that proceeds from all types of forfeitures in the 1987-88 fiscal
year constituted only $150,221 and that "[d]rug law forfeitures were only a portion of that
amount." Richmond Times-Dispatch, Nov. 4, 1990, at A17.
32. Hughes & O'Connell, In personam (Criminal) Forfeiture and Federal Drug Felonies:
An Expansion of a Harsh English Tradition into a Modern Dilemma, 11 PEPPERDINE L.
REv. 613 (1984).
33. C.J. Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U.S. at 139.
34. See, e.g. 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-249 (Cum. Supp. 1990), 19.2-
386.1 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
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b. Same Procedure for Criminal or Civil Forfeiture
While generally understood as providing separate remedies,3 5 civil for-
feiture and criminal prosecution are not mutually exclusive.3 6 Since the
United States Supreme Court decision in United States v. United States
Coin & Currency,7 courts consistently hold that there is no legal differ-
ence between the two proceedings.3 8 United States Coin & Curency un-
derscores the merger of the civil and criminal aspects of forfeiture:
From the relevant constitutional standpoint there is no difference between a
man who "forfeits" $8,674 because he has used the money in illegal gam-
bling activities and a man who pays a "criminal fine" of $8,674 as a result of
the same course of conduct. In both instances, money liability is predicated
upon a finding of the owner's wrongful conduct.
3 9
Although the Supreme Court in United States Coin & Currency af-
forded defendants in civil forfeiture actions the protection of some consti-
tutional procedural safeguards, 40 most courts recognize that the civil ac-
tion generally is not "criminal enough" 41 to warrant heightened judicial
scrutiny.4 2 Centuries of precedent support a recognition that forfeiture
35. United States v. D.K.G. Appaloosas, Inc., 829 F.2d 532 (5th Cir. 1987); United States
v. Premises Known as 2639 Meetinghouse Rd., 633 F. Supp. 979, 994 (E.D. Pa. 1986). Most
state courts hold that civil forfeiture statutes are sufficiently penal in nature to require strict
construction.
36. United States v. Dunn, 802 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 931 (1987).
The government does not have to file an indictment or information as a prerequisite to
commencing a civil forfeiture action in federal court. To this end, the fifth amendment guar-
antee against double jeopardy is inapplicable. United States v. One Assortment of 89 Fire-
arms, 465 U.S. 1099 (1984). But see Coffey v. United States, 116 U.S. 436 (1886).
37. 401 U.S. 715 (1971).
38. United States v. Grande, 620 F.2d 1026, 1039 (4th Cir. 1980) (Two defendants ap-
pealed but were denied certiorari. See Berg v. United States, 620 F.2d 1039, cert. denied,
449 U.S. 919 (1980); Hawthorne v. United States, 620 F.2d 1039, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 830
(1980)); see United States v. Miscellaneous Jewelry, 667 F. Supp. 232, 242 (D. Md. 1987).
39. 401 U.S. at 718.
40. See also One Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965)(fourth amend-
ment warrant requirement); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886)(fifth amendment
protection against self-incrimination); United States v. 25.075 Acres, Located in Swift Creek
Township, Wake County, N.C., 687 F. Supp. 1005 (E.D.N.C. 1988)(fourth amendment war-
rant requirement); United States v. Real Property Located at 25231 Mammoth Circle, 659
F. Supp. 925 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (fourth amendment procedural requirements); see also United
States v. $39,000.00 in Canadian Currency, 801 F.2d 1210 (10th Cir. 1986) (if the govern-
ment opts for the relatively lax procedural protection of an in rem civil proceeding, thereby
circumventing the stringent requirements of criminal forfeiture, the government will not be
permitted to urge considerations going to the criminal nature of the underlying offense).
41. United States v. $2,500.00 in U.S. Currency, 689 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
465 U.S. 1099 (1982), reh'g denied, 466 U.S. 994 (1982); United States v. One 1970 Pontiac
GTO, 529 F.2d 65, 66 (9th Cir. 1976).
42. One Lot Emerald Cut Stones & One Ring v. United States, 409 U.S. 232 (1972);
United States v. Santoro, 866 F.2d 1538 (4th Cir. 1989). The U.S. Supreme Court seems
[Vol. 25:171
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statutes are so broad that civil liability is "predicated" upon some deter-
minable level of criminal conduct.43
Civil forfeiture is penal in nature. Most civil forfeiture statutes are
broad enough to encompass nearly every form of narcoband imaginable,
including houses, cars, airplanes, yachts and machine guns as well as ne-
gotiable instruments, leaseholds and remainders. Most of the legislation
expanding the scope of forfeitable property has been passed since 1984.
With the exception of New York,44 state civil forfeiture statutes for the
most part have been modeled after section 881.
2. Federal Civil Forfeiture Procedure
Although section 881 governs federal civil forfeiture in drug cases, there
are no procedural rules within the body of the statute.
45
a. Influence of Customs Law
Section 881(d) directs the Attorney General to consult customs law to
commence a civil forfeiture action. Supplemental Rules for Admiralty and
Maritime Claims, Rule C(2) sets forth the procedure for federal civil for-
feiture proceedings.4" The complicated scheme of administrative or sum-
mary civil forfeiture proceedings is set out in 19 U.S.C. sections 1600-
1624, illustrating important differences between judicial and administra-
tive or summary civil forfeiture.47 Functioning as an additional way to
bring civil action, section 1603 empowers the United States government
to seize narcoband upon process issued in the same manner as provided
for a search warrant under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure."
Whenever a seizure of narcoband for violation of the customs law is
unwilling to entertain challenges based upon both procedural and substantive rights to
counsel under the sixth amendment. See e.g., Caplan & Drysdale, Chartered v. United
States, 109 S. Ct. 2667 (1989); United States v. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. 2657 (1989).
43. See United States v. One Ford Coupe, 272 U.S. 321 (1926); Goldsmith-Grant v.
United States, 254 U.S. 505 (1921).
44. Forfeiture actions in New York are governed by section 1311 of the New York Civil
Practice Law and Rules Law. A civil action may be commenced against a non-criminal de-
fendant to recover narcoband. N.Y. CIV. PRAc. L. & R. 1311 (McKinney 1990).
45. United States v. $38,000.00 in U.S. Currency, 816 F.2d 1538, 1540 (11th Cir. 1987);
United States v. $152,160.00 in U.S. Currency, 680 F. Supp. 354, 357 (D. Colo. 1988). Sec-
tion 881(d) appears to be the only procedural aspect of the statute. This provision states
that customs law, to the extent that it is not inconsistent with section 881, shall apply to
federal civil drug forfeiture. However, section 881 does not specifically say which customs
laws apply.
46. See 28 U.S.C.A. Rule C(2) § (West 1970 & Supp. 1990) (Supplemental Rules for Ad-
miralty & Maritime Claims).
47. Cf. Ninety-One Thousand Dollars, 715 F. Supp. 423 (D.R.I. 1989).
48. See 19 U.S.C. § 1603(a) (1988); 19 C.F.R. §§ 162.21 to .22 (1990); 21 C.F.R. § 1316.72
(1990).
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made, the arresting officer must inform the appropriate customs official,
who in turn must immediately report the seizure to the U.S. District At-
torney.49 The U.S. District Attorney then inquires into the facts of the
case, and if it appears probable that a forfeiture is likely, the proper pro-
ceedings are initiated.5 0 If the value of the narcoband does not exceed
$100,000 or involves the importation, exportation, transportation or stor-
age of a controlled substance, customs must issue a notice of seizure to-
gether with a statement of the intention to forfeit and sell, which must be
sent to each party who appears to have an interest in the seized article.5 1
Although forfeiture notices provide the claimant with information
about filing petitions for remission and mitigation, 2 these notice provi-
sions are inapplicable to controlled substances." Any person claiming an
interest in narcoband, however, may file a claim with customs and give a
bond within twenty days after seizure.5 4 If a claim and bond is filed, the
U.S. Attorney must institute judicial forfeiture proceedings pursuant to
21 U.S.C. section 881. If no claim is given or bond filed within twenty
days, customs will declare the narcoband forfeited and will sell it at a
public auction, deducting all the proper expenses of the seizure and
forfeiture.5 5
The DEA Special Agent-in-Charge or the DEA Asset Forfeiture Unit
also has the power to declare a forfeiture of narcoband whose value does
not exceed $100,000.58 The officer in charge of FBI Property Management
has the same authority.57 A declaration of forfeiture in an administrative
proceeding, moreover, has the same effect as a final decree in a judicial
proceeding. 58 Section 1610 provides that all civil forfeiture for drug felony
crimes may be instituted by administrative or summary civil forfeiture,
regardless of the value of the narcoband.
If any person claiming an interest in the narcoband pays the full value
of the narcoband seized as determined under 19 U.S.C. section 1606 and
21 C.F.R. sections 1316.74-75 (1990), customs may release the narco-
49. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1602, 1603(b) (1988).
50. See id. § 1604.
51. See id. § 1607 (1984); 19 C.F.R. § 162.45; see also Gutt v. United States, 641 F. Supp.
603 (W.D. Va. 1986); Winters v. Working, 510 F. Supp. 14 (W.D. Tex. 1980).
52. 28 C.F.R. § 9.1-.7 (1989).
53. 19 C.F.R. § 162.45(a) (1989).
54. 19 U.S.C. § 1608 (1988); 19 C.F.R. § 162.47 (1989); 21 C.F.R. § 1316.76 (1989); see In
rd Application of Williams, 628 F. Supp. 171, 172 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).
55. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1609(a), 1613 (1988); 19 C.F.R. § 162.46 (1989).
56. 21 C.F.R. § 1316.77(a) (1989).
57. Id. § 1316.77(b) (1990).
58. 19 U.S.C. § 1609(b) (1988). If the value of narcoband exceeds $100,000 or is narcoband
whose importation is not prohibited, or the narcoband was not used to import, export,
transport, or store any controlled substance, then forfeiture may only be had by judicial civil
action. Id. § 1610.
[Vol. 25:171
SUBSTANTIAL CONNECTION
band.59 Similarly, any person with an interest in the narcoband may file a
petition for remission or mitigation of the forfeiture." Such mitigation is
within the sole discretion of the appropriate customs official.6 1
The Secretary of the Treasury may discontinue administrative proceed-
ings in favor of the forfeiture under state law.62 Recent steps by the Sen-
ate to enact wider forfeitures include instituting administrative forfeiture
for sums up to $500,000 in cash and urging that drug felons be forced to
give up a percentage of their yearly incomes. 6' The government may be-
gin a civil forfeiture proceeding in one of two ways. It may serve a verified
complaint containing allegations of wrongful conduct. Section 881(b) re-
quires the government to properly plead and later establish probable
cause for its belief that a substantial connection exists between the prop-
erty to be forfeited and the illegal activity.
6 4
According to Rule C(3) of the Supplemental Rules for Admiralty and
Maritime Claims, the clerk of the court may issue a "warrant for the ar-
rest of the vessel or other property that is the subject of the action."6 5
This warrant begins the forfeiture action. The attorney general may also
begin the forfeiture proceeding by seizing the narcoband, 6 bypassing
both the warrant process and the exigent circumstances exceptions,6 7
upon his own determination that there is probable cause to believe the
property is subject to forfeiture.6 8 If narcoband seized under section
881(b) is not returned to the lawful owner within ten days, the United
States must initiate judicial proceedings "promptly or within such time as
59. 19 U.S.C. § 1614 (1984); 10 C.F.R. § 1623.44 (1989).
60. 19 C.F.R. §§ 171.11-.14; 21 C.F.R. §§ 1316.79-.81 (1989).
61. 19 U.S.C. § 1618 (1988); 19 C.F.R. §§ 171.21-.24, 171.31-33.
62. 19 U.S.C. § 1616(a) (1988).
63. See Anti-Drug Juggernaut Rolls on in Congress, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 23, 1989, at 5.
64. See United States v. $364,960.00 in U.S. Currency, 661 F.2d 319, 323 (5th Cir. Unit B
1981).
65. 28 U.S.C.A. Rules C(2), C(3) (West 1970 & Supp. 1990) (Supplemental Rules for Ad-
miralty & Maritime Claims). The Supreme Court of the United States has struck down
statutes similar to Rules C(2) and C(3) on the grounds that such statutes violate the proce-
dural due process requirement of the fifth and fourteenth amendments because they fail to
provide for meaningful notice and opportunity to be heard in the context of prejudgment
seizure. See e.g., Peralta v. Heights Medical Center, Inc., 485 U.S. 80 (1988); North Ga.
Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S.
600 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S.
337 (1969).
66. 21 U.S.C.A. § 881(b)(4) (West Supp. 1990).
67. Id. § 881(b); United States v. $128,035.00 in U.S. Currency, 628 F. Supp. 668 (S.D.
Ohio 1986), appeal dismissed, 806 F.2d 262 (6th Cir. 1986); United States v. Certain Real
Estate Property Located at 4880 S.E. Dixie Highway, 612 F. Supp. 1492 (S.D. Fla. 1985),
vacated, 838 F.2d 1558 (1986). In order to avoid the serious fourth amendment problems
created by § 881(b)(4), in the clear absence of any indication of congressional intent, the
court must read into that subsection the requirement of exigent circumstances.
68. Certain Real Estate Property, 612 F. Supp. at 1495.
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allowed by the court."6
b. Constitutional Considerations
Constitutional problems emerge in any taking of property, and no less
so under federal civil forfeiture. Issues of meaningful notice and opportu-
nity to be heard presented in the Sniadach line of cases have led the
federal courts to deem forfeiture criminal by nature, for the purposes of
protecting the defendant's fourth and fifth amendment rights.
70
In an important constitutional challenge to section 881 originating pro-
cess, the court, in United States v. Real Property Located at 25231
Mammoth Circle,7' held that section 881 must comply with the proce-
dural requirements imposed by the fourth amendment.7 1 Compared with
the due process requirement for replevin or attachment actions, Rule
C(3) has not been interpreted to require that the allegations in the veri-
fied government complaint be reviewed by a detached and neutral judicial
officer before the complaint is issued.7 3
The procedural law followed by the Second, Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh
Circuits, although not mandated by Rule C(3), requires a judicial finding
of "probable cause" before a seizure warrant is issued, except where the
clerk of the court makes a finding of "exigent circumstances. 7 4 In fact,
Rule C(3) specifically exempts civil forfeiture actions under section 881
from such rigorous judicial scrutiny. Thus, a clerk may issue warrants for
arrest of narcoband based solely upon the verified complaint of the gov-
ernment. There is no independent statutory requirement of review by a
detached and neutral judicial officer. Such a procedure may violate the
fourth amendment because it does not satisfy the requirement of judi-
cially determined probable cause and particularity. 75
69. 28 U.S.C.A. Rule C(4) (West 1970 & Supp. 1990) (Supplemental Rules for Admiralty
& Maritime Claims).
70. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); United States v. One 1970 Pontiac GTO,
529 F.2d 65 (9th Cir. 1976). See generally SHERRIS, Drug Related Forfeitures: Land Titles
Issues, Prob. & Prop., (Jan.-Feb. 1990).
71. 659 F. Supp. 925 (C.D. Cal. 1987)
72. Id. at 927; see also Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345 (1972); In re Application
of Kingsley, 614 F. Supp. 219 (D. Mass. 1985), appeal dismissed, 802 F.2d 571 (1st Cir.
1986).
73. But see Richmond Tenants Org., Inc. v. Kemp, No. 3:90CV00346 (E.D. Va. Dec. 19,
1990) (requirement of meaningful notice and opportunity to be heard prior to seizure of
government housing).
74. United States v. 25.075 Acres, Located in Swift Creek Township, Wake County, N.C.,
687 F. Supp. 1005 (E.D.N.C. 1988). See United States v. 124 E. North Ave., Lake Forest,
Ill., 651 F. Supp. 1350 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
75. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). But see Amstar v. S/S Alexandros T., 664
F.2d 904 (4th Cir. 1981); Merchants Nat'l Bank of Mobile v. The Dredge General G.L. Gil-
lespie, 663 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1981).
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The Advisory Committee on the 1985 Amendments to the Rules took a
different view. They contemplated a simple warrant/order with con-
clusory findings. Citing United States v. $8,850. 00,6 and Calero-Toledo
v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.," the committee argued that a prompt
hearing or review by a judicial officer is not constitutionally mandated
and could prejudice the government in its prosecution. The committee
did not discuss the problems inherent in any statutory grant of power
that allows a clerk of the court to determine what does and what does not
constitute "exigent circumstances."78
3. State Civil Forfeiture Procedure
The Virginia scheme is a typical example of state civil forfeiture proce-
dure. The filing of an information commences a forfeiture action.71 The
information must name as defendants all owners and lienholders and
must specifically describe the propefty and the grounds for forfeiture.
Similar to federal legislation, section 19.2-386.1 of the Virginia Code per-
mits seizure before the filing of an information which must be made
within ninety days after seizure or the property must be released to the
owner.
8 0
The Virginia Code bars civil forfeiture actions if brought three years
after "discovery" by the Commonwealth of the last act giving rise to for-
feiture.81 Both the federal and state forfeiture procedures provide exemp-
tions for innocent owners and bona fide purchasers.
8 2
C. Nine Different Standards in Federal Circuits
Circuits and states define the "facilitation" element in nine different
ways, illustrating the historical development of the concept. Differences
of opinion regarding facilitation point out the need for a more workable
76. 461 U.S. 555 (1983).
77. 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
78. Swift Creek Township, 687 F. Supp. at 1005.
79. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-386.1 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
80. Id. The information must be filed within 90 days, compared with "promptly or within
such time as allowed by court" under Rule C(4).
81. Id.
82. Id. § 19.2-386.8. For recent discussions of the "innocent owner defense," as it relates
to section 881, see United States v. Parcel of Real Property Known as 6109 Grubb Rd.,
Millcreek Township, Erie, Pa., 886 F.2d 618 (3rd Cir.), reh'g denied, 890 F.2d 659 (3rd Cir.
1989); United States v. One Parcel of Real Estate at 11885 S.W. 46 St., Miami, Fla., 715 F.
Supp. 355 (S.D. Fla. 1989); United States v. Marks, 703 F. Supp. 623 (E.D. Mich. 1988);
United States v. One Single Residence & Outbuildings Located at 15621 S.W. 209th Ave.,
Miami, Fla., 699 F. Supp. 1531 (S.D. Fla. 1988), a'fld, 894 F.2d 1511 (11th Cir. 1990). Bona
fide purchaser provisions are also prevalent in both state and federal legislation. See, e.g.,
VA. CODp ANN. § 19.2-386.8. Bona fide purchaser exemptions are especially important to title
insurance companies.
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legal definition. An examination of the major split among the circuits over
the "facilitation" element for civil forfeiture of narcoband in drug felony
cases lays the foundation for formulations of such a definition.
Cases from those jurisdictions which have addressed the meaning of
"facilitate" illustrate widely varying interpretations of what the govern-
ment must show in order to satisfy the facilitation element of its cause of
action. A defendant can travel from state to state, committing the same
illegal act in each different state, with the result that his narcoband in
one state will forfeit and in another state it will not. The burden of proof
upon the government may range from proving that the property was used
as "cover" for the illegal activity at one extreme, to proving that the
narcoband was used in "substantial connection" with the drug transac-
tion at the other extreme.
This current nine-way split concerning the proper legal meaning of "fa-
cilitation" suggests judicial confusion over the role of congressional in-
tent, canons of statutory construction and precedent in resolving this
complex criminal litigation.
The District of Columbia and Federal Circuits have no standard for
interpretation of the facilitation concept. The Eleventh Circuit applies
the "cover" test; while the Eighth Circuit applies the de minimis test.
The Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Circuits apply the "in any manner" test.
The Tenth Circuit looks for "purpose" and "subsequent distribution"
and for "links" between the property and drugs. The Ninth Circuit ap-
plies the "aggregate of facts" test, requiring some connective link prova-
ble by a "combination" of evidence. The First Circuit applies the "antece-
dent relationship" plus "integral part" test; while the Second Circuit
applies the "sufficient nexus" standard test. The Third and Fourth Cir-
cuits apply the "substantial connection" test. The author creates these
labels to reach a sensible paradigm of facilitation. In the following discus-
sion of each test, the differences of opinion from circuit to circuit become
apparent.
1. Jurisdictions with no Judicial Standard
The precise reach of the facilitation element remains an unexplored
question in two circuits. In the Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia 3 and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,84 the meaning
of property "used in any manner to facilitate" has yet to be addressed.
While these courts consistently phrase the issue in terms of whether the
narcoband "has been used to facilitate the sale of a controlled substance,"
they do not directly answer the question of what exactly facilitation
83. United States v. Fafowara, 865 F.2d 360, 362 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
84. United States v. One 1979 Cadillac Coupe De Ville, 833 F.2d 994 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
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means. Rather, these courts leave the determination of the legal meaning
of substantive elements, such as facilitation, to juries. The practice con-
tributes substantially to the uncertainty surrounding civil forfeiture in
general.
85
Jury determination goes beyond merely deciding whether the narco-
band was used to "facilitate" the drug deal. When the jury decides what
"facilitation" means, the issue of what constitutes the appropriate legal
meaning of facilitation becomes a question of fact and not a question of
law."8 Asking the jury to determine the legal meaning of the "facilitation"
element violates the common law principle that juries are supposed to
decide only questions of fact.87 The Ninth Circuit, for example, suggests
that "the district court's determination of probable cause for forfeiture is
reviewable de novo as a question of law."88 Courts which leave facilitation
to juries as an issue of fact provide no guidance to practicing attorneys
because the result may be a different legal standard in every case.
2. "Cover" Test
The "cover" test of facilitation only requires the narcoband to function
as a disguise or camouflage for illegal activity. In United States .v. Ri-
vera, 9 the Eleventh Circuit provided an excellent illustration of "cover"
as a standard for the facilitation element. Willie Burgess bred quarter
horses on his farm near Covington, Georgia. He also sold and distributed
high-purity heroin from the farm to local dealers. The federal government
sought forfeiture of the ranch, including twenty-seven quarter horses, but
it offered no proof at trial that the horses played any role in Burgess'
drug trafficking activities. Following the United States Supreme Court's
85. Although thirty-three states have reported decisions on this aspect of the civil forfei-
ture cause of action, the non-delineated, factual jury interpretation of "used to facilitate" is
present only in the state law of Arkansas, Washington, Oregon, Georgia, Mississippi, Wis-
consin and Kansas. See, e.g., Fafowara, 865 F.2d at 362; Beebe v. State, 298 Ark. 119, 765
S.W.2d 943 (1989) (guns seized not forfeitable absent evidence that they were "equipment"
used in delivering a controlled substance); State v. Anderson, 194 Ga. App. 139, 390 S.E.2d
68 (1989); State v. One 1978 Chevrolet Corvette, 8 Kan. App. 2d 747, 667 P.2d 893 (1983);
Saik v. State ex rel. Miss. Bureau of Narcotics, 473 So. 2d 188, 190-91 (Miss. 1985); Linn
County v. 22.16 Acres of Real Property & Fixtures Attached Thereto, 95 Or. App. 59, 767
P.2d 473 (1989) aff'd, 309 Or. 272, 786 P.2d 723 (1990); Forfeiture of One 1980 Porsche, 54
Wash. App. 498, 774 P.2d 528 (1989); State v. S & S Meats, Inc., 92 Wis. 2d 64, 284 N.W.2d
712 (Ct. App. 1979).
86. Since the standard of care in a particular case "is a legal rule, from which the jury [is]
not free to deviate, it is a matter of law, and is to be applied by the court." W. PROSSER & R.
K nTON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 236 (5th ed. 1984).
87. A jury may not be called upon to determine a question of law, nor to speculate on the
meaning of the law. W.H. BRYSON, HANDBOOK ON VIRGINIA PROCEDuRE 446 (1989).
88. United States v. Padilla, 888 F.2d 642, 643 (9th Cir. 1989).
89. 884 F.2d 544, 545-46 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1322 (1990).
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broad language in Russello v. United States,"0 the Eleventh Circuit held
the term "facilitate," as used in section 853 of the continuing criminal
enterprise statute,9' encompasses the situation in which a horse-breeding
business and the horses on hand are used as "cover" for the drug
enterprise.92
Following this theory, to be subject to forfeiture, narcoband need not
have any physical contact with the sale, manufacture, or distribution of a
controlled substance, intended or unintended, so long as at some time it
was used as a "front" or "cover" for the drug dealing.9 ' Choosing a broad
construction of forfeiture statutes, 94 the Eleventh Circuit found clear con-
gressional intent that "cover" is facilitation. The so-called cover test for
the meaning of "used in any manner to facilitate" is the broadest stan-
dard used.
Federal civil forfeiture statutes not only authorize forfeiture of narco-
band "used to facilitate" illegal drug activitybut narcoband "intended to
be used to facilitate" as well. 9 5 In United States v. One 1980 Bertram 58
Foot Motor Yacht,9 the Eleventh Circuit determined whether a ship
known as the Mologa was subject to forfeiture. At trial, the government
presented evidence that defendant Rodriguez had told one of the ship's
captains that the Mologa would be used in the trafficking business and
that alterations would be necessary to "optimize its drug-carrying capa-
bility." 7 Before any plans could be executed and before the vessel could
be used to actually transport any marijuana, the owners were arrested.
In reaching the conclusion that the yacht was "intended for use" in the
interstate transportation of narcotics, the court was "mindful that the
minimal amount of action taken in this case to effect the smuggler's crim-
inal intentions is near the outer parameter of the scope of the 'intended
for use' language .. "98 The Eleventh Circuit's positions taken in Ber-
tram 58 Foot Motor Yacht and Rivera are the broadest in the country,
though language in the former case suggests that the court recognizes an
90. 464 U.S. 16, 27-29 (1983).
91. 21 U.S.C. § 853 (1988).
92. Rivera, 884 F.2d at 546. The court in Rivera interpreted the words of a criminal for-
feiture statute.
93. See United States v. One 1977 Lincoln Mark V Coupe, 643 F.2d 154, 157 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 818 (1981) (presence of automobile with its hood up provided a con-
venient cover, whereas two men alone in an alley might have appeared suspicious). Recent
Third Circuit cases suggest that this case is an anomaly in the circuit.
94. Russello, 464 U.S. at 27-29.
95. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988). See Jennings v. State, 553 N.E.2d 191 (Ind. App.
1990) ($1,474 in cash on defendant and over fifty grams of marijuana in car were intended
for use in dealing marijuana).
96. 876 F.2d 884, 887 (11th Cir. 1989).
97. Id. at 886.
98. Id. at 887.
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outer limit to the standard.
Forfeiture of an automobile used for transportation to a hotel where a
drug deal was arranged, but not consummated, was the subject of United
States v. One 1979 Porsche Coupe.99 The Eleventh Circuit, held that:
"[t]o support a forfeiture under § 881, the government must demonstrate
probable cause for the belief that a substantial connection exists between
the vehicle to be forfeited and the relevant criminal activity .. ."oo Al-
though the defendant's car transported neither drugs nor money, it trans-
ported the "pivotal" figure in the attempted drug deal "several hundred
miles to the precise location" of the proposed deal. This pattern of activ-
ity was enough to establish a "substantial connection."101
One 1979 Porsche Coupe would suggest that the Eleventh Circuit fol-
lows the stricter "substantial connection" test. This is a logical conclusion
especially since the Eleventh Circuit in Bonner v. City of Prichard'02
bound itself to follow the precedent set before September 30, 1981 by its
predecessor court, the Fifth Circuit. 0 Bonner followed the prior Fifth
Circuit standard set in United States v. $364,960.00 in United States
Currency.0 4 Yet based on the more recent cases of Bertram and Rivera
the Eleventh Circuit apparently discarded the standards of Bonner and
$364,960.00 in United States Currency in favor of the "cover" test for
facilitation which presently remains firmly in place.
The substantial connection test may not be dead, however, in the Elev-
enth Circuit. A recent case suggests a return to the reasoning expressed in
$364,960.00 in United States Currency. In United States v. Four Parcels
of Real Property in Greene & Tuscaloosa Counties in the State of Ala-
bama, ' 0 5 the court signaled a departure from the "cover" test. The case
involved forfeiture of a bulldozer that was allegedly purchased with drug
money. The court placed the burden of proof upon the government to
show that "a substantial connection exists between the property to be
forfeited and an illegal exchange of a controlled substance."'' 06
In an earlier case United States v. $41,305.00 in Currency & Travellers
99. 709 F.2d 1424 (11th Cir. 1983).
100. Id. at 1426.
101. Id.
102. 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981).
103. In Banner v. City of Prichard, the Eleventh Circuit adopted as binding precedent all
of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on
Sept. 30, 1981. Id. at 1207. Former Fifth Circuit cases upheld forfeiture of narcoband whose
sole connection to the criminal activity was its use in transporting the narcotics supplier to
the scene of the drug transaction. See United States v. One 1977 Cadillac Coupe De Vile,
644 F.2d 500, 503 (5th Cir. 1981).
104. 661 F.2d 319, 323 (5th Cir. 1981).
105. 893 F.2d 1245 (11th Cir. 1990).
106. Id. at 1249.
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Checks,'10 7 the court outlined eight factors it relied upon in making the
crucial assessment of whether a "substantial connection" existed:
(1) The defendant had a reputation among law enforcement authorities as
a drug dealer;
(2) The defendant had delivered a kilo of cocaine to an individual in Ar-
kansas and had arranged for a subsequent delivery;
(3) The defendant stated to this individual that the cocaine which he de-
livered was a part of a larger shipment;
(4) The initial delivery of cocaine by the defendant to the individual in
Arkansas was on consignment;
(5) On the occasion of the defendant's arrest, he was scheduled to contact
the individual in Arkansas and receive payment for the cocaine previously
delivered;
(6) Instead, the defendant had in his possession a second kilo of cocaine
at the time of his arrest;
(7) The defendant was subsequently prosecuted in Arkansas and received
a life sentence; and
(8) The defendant was subsequently indicted in federal court in Arkansas
and in Miami for offenses regarding controlled substances."0 8
3. De Minimis Test
The de minimis test subjects property to forfeiture if there is any phys-
ical contact between such property and any aspect of criminal wrongdo-
ing surrounding drug transactions, short of mere happenstance. The
Eighth Circuit approved the de minimis, or "mere transportation" test, in
a case that involved forfeiture of an automobile.10 9 In United States v.
One 1980 Red Ferrari, the evidence showed that the defendant had co-
caine in his pocket while driving the sports car.110 The court concluded
that "a vehicle is subject to forfeiture no matter how small the quantity
of contraband found." ''
Four years earlier, though, in United States v. One 1976 Ford F-150
Pickup,1 2 the Eighth Circuit had declined to find a truck seen on one
occasion in an area of marijuana cultivation to be narcoband "substan-
107. 802 F.2d 1339 (11th Cir. 1986).
108. Id. at 1344 n.8.
109. United States v. One 1980 Red Ferrari, 875 F.2d 186, 188 (8th Cir. 1989).
110. Id. at 188.
111. Id. (citing United States v. One 1976 Porsche 911S, 670 F.2d 810, 812 (9th Cir.
1979)); see also United States v. One 1974 Cadillac Eldorado Sedan, 548 F.2d 421, 425 (2d
Cir. 1977) (transportation of drugs, however minute, is sufficient to merit forfeiture).
112. 769 F.2d 525 (8th Cir. 1985).
[Vol. 25:171
SUBSTANTIAL CONNECTION
tially associated" with the defendant's marijuana farm. 113 The court de-
clined to adopt the rule that "mere transportation" of persons to the loca-
tion of illicit activity supports forfeiture. 1 4 While the Eighth Circuit has
not explicitly rejected the well-delineated showing required of the govern-
ment in One 1976 Ford F-150 Pickup, the older rule now appears
inoperative.
Currently the Eighth Circuit maintains that if persons "make real
property available as a situs for an illegal drug transaction, it is forfeita-
ble."'1 5 The property in United States v. Premises Known as 3639-2nd
Street, N.E. was admittedly used to sell drugs. Embracing the "substan-
tial connection" standard set forth in Ford F-150 Pickup, the court held
that the "use of the house to sell cocaine sufficed to establish a sufficient
connection.""*6
While "cover" establishes a sufficient connection in the Eleventh Cir-
cuit, a sufficient connection is established in the Eighth Circuit by the de
minimis action of making the real property available for a drug deal. Al-
though the statute requires something more than "incidental or fortuitous
contact between the property and the underlying illegal activity," the
property need not be indispensable to the commission of the offense."17
The de minimis test for the "facilitation" concept is a strict lexical view
of facilitation, differing radically from the approach taken by the First,
Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits. For the Eighth Circuit, the term "fa-
cilitate" encompasses any activity making the prohibited conduct less dif-
ficult or free from hindrance or obstruction. 1"8 State courts of Connecti-
cut," 9 Illinois, 2 0 Utah,'12 and Arizona' 22 follow the de minimis standard.
113. Id. at 527.
114. Id. at 526-27.
115. United States v. Premises Known as 3639-2nd St., N.E., 869 F.2d 1093, 1096 (8th
Cir. 1989) (citing United States v. 26.075 Acres, 687 F. Supp. 1005, 1014 (E.D.N.C. 1988)).
116. Id. at 1097. See also United States v. Walker, 900 F.2d 1201 (8th Cir. 1990). In
Walker, the court noted that at the time of seizure of the Mercedes, its only connection to
illegal drug transactions was telephone conversations about prior drug deals made from the
car phone. The Eighth Circuit ruled that there was no probable cause at the time of seizure
to believe that the car had been used to facilitate an illegal drug transaction. After seizure,
the government discovered one kilo of drugs in the trunk, along with three 9mm pistols, an
electronic scale, and $57,000.00 cash in a spare tire compartment. All of the evidence discov-
ered after the seizure of the Mercedes, however, was suppressed at the civil forfeiture
proceeding.
117. 3639-2nd St., N.E., 869 F.2d at 1096.
118. Id.; see also United States v. One 1977 Lincoln Mark V Coupe, 643 F.2d 154, 157
(3rd Cir. 1981); United States v. One 1950 Buick Sedan, 231 F.2d 219, 222 (3rd Cir. 1956).
119. In State v. Gaudio, 19 Conn. App. 588, 562 A.2d 1156 (1989), a vehicle was subject to
forfeiture where police discovered five and one-half grams of cocaine in the glove compart-
ment. In Connecticut, narcoband is subject to forfeiture if it is "used as a means of commit-
ting any criminal offense." CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-33g (West 1988). See also State v.
Daniels, 789 S.W.2d 243 (Mo. App. 1990) (defendant who had previously been convicted of
possession of marijuana lwas collaterally estopped from denying knowledge of presence of
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4. "In Any Manner" Test
Unlike the very broad de minimis test, the "in any manner" test re-
quires a showing that property was actually used, or was intended to be
used, in some way related to the drug dealing. Though limited by the
requirement of use rather than merely a tangential relationship, the stan-
dard is broadened by the wide scope of uses included-any use.
After September 30, 1981,123 the Fifth Circuit considers forfeiture
proper if the narcoband was used "in any manner" to facilitate the sale,
transportation or similar act of a controlled substance. 24 Some Fifth Cir-
cuit decisions, however, adopt the "substantial connection" analysis of
the facilitation element. 25 In United States v. 1964 Beechcraft Baron
Aircraft,2 ' defendant Preston flew a drug dealer to Abilene, Texas, in his
Beechcraft Baron. Undercover agents gave the drug dealer a five-gallon
container full of P2P, which had an electronic device in it that emitted
signals. Preston and the drug dealer then flew from Abilene to Amarillo.
Using the electronic device, the agents traced the container to Preston's
business in Amarillo. 2 7 The court specifically rejected the "substantial
connection" standard as "inapplicable" to section 881(a)(4), holding in-
stead, that "use in any manner" was the proper test for the facilitation
concept. 28
marijuana in the glove compartment of his car in subsequent forfeiture proceeding).
120. Illinois defines "facilitate" in a way similar to Connecticut but applies an "in any
manner" test to determine whether the drug transaction was "made easier." People ex rel.
Daley v. 1986 Honda, 537 N.E.2d 1077 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).
121. State v. One 1982 Silver Honda Motorcycle, Utah Registration 5P218,
VINIHFSC0229CA35870, 735 P.2d 392 (Utah App. 1987) (small amount of contraband in-
volved did not preclude forfeiture of motorcycle); State v. One 1983 Pontiac, 717 P.2d 1338
(Utah 1986) (no requirement of profit motive; use of car to transport drug-using son on two
occasions). In Utah, even a small amount of contraband present in the house or car will
support forfeiture of the entire property.
122. 1977 Cessna 206, License No. N756HQ, Serial No. U20604107, 141 Ariz. 196, 688
P.2d 1088 (1984). Evidence before an Arizona court that an aircraft which had marijuana in
it was of a type "normally used" by drug dealers supported forfeiture of the plane.
123. According to Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) after this
date, the Eleventh Circuit is not bound by Fifth Circuit precedent. Therefore, the Eleventh
Circuit should be bound by neither United States v. 1964 Beechcraft Baron Aircraft, 691
F.2d 725 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, sub nom. Preston v. United States 461 U.S. 914
(1983), nor United States v. One 1979 Mercury Cougar, 666 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1982).
124. 1964 Beechcraft Baron, 691 F.2d at 727 (citing One 1979 Mercury Cougar, 666 F.2d
at 230 n.3). This interpretation is similar to the approach taken by the Sixth and Seventh
Circuits, and is joined by the state courts of Oklahoma, Nevada, D.C., Illinois, and New
Mexico. See infra notes 139-59 and accompanying text.
125. See, e.g., United States v. $364,960.00 in U.S. Currency, 661 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1981);
United States v. $4,000.00 in U.S. Currency, 1990 WL 752 (E.D. La. Jan. 2, 1990).
126. 691 F.2d at 727. Other courts believe 1964 Beechcraft Baron and its "in any man-
ner" test represent the facilitation concept for the Fifth Circuit. See United States v. One
Parcel of Real Property, 712 F. Supp. 810, 811 (D. Or. 1989).
127. 1964 Beechcraft Baron, 691 F.2d at 726-27.
128. Id. at 728.
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In United States v. One Gates Learjet,1 9 the Fifth Circuit explicitly
rejected any common standard for all civil forfeiture proceedings. Instead,
it applied different evidentiary requirements to different types of narco-
band, depending on the type of property and, to a certain extent, the
nature of the criminal activity allegedly engaged in. The phrase, "used to
facilitate," is found in section 881 (a)(4) and (a)(7) and the phrase, "fur-
nished or intended to be furnished," appears in section 881(a)(6). 130 The
court in One Gates Learjet gave the words in each of those sections dif-
ferent meanings. Therefore, the amount of evidence sufficient to establish
that the narcoband "facilitated" the drug deal varies with each type of
property and the particular statutory language.
In One Gates Learjet the aircraft had been confiscated pursuant to
three separate sections of the Federal Criminal Code: 21 U.S.C. section
881(a)(4), 21 U.S.C. section 881 (a)(6), and 19 U.S.C. section 1595a(a).
For each of these laws, Judge Politz wrote, the question of forfeiture must
be based upon a "totality of the circumstances, not just the quantity of
the contraband." 31 In addition to the quantity of drugs on board, the
court looked to the dangerousness of the possession."3' The facts indi-
cated that after a fruitless sniff-search, a DEA chemist found a 10-to-14/
100,000 of an ounce particle of cocaine in vacuum dust. Based upon this
"trace" and hearsay evidence the government sought forfeiture. 3'
To sustain the forfeiture under section 881(a)(4), the "transportation"
,allegation in the verified complaint, the court required a showing that the
Learjet had been used in any manner to transport or "facilitate" the
transportation of the cocaine.1" The presence of a quantity of cocaine so
minute as to be invisible to the naked eye even if "aided by a large mag-
nifying glass" will not support a showing of probable cause. 135 The gov-
ernment failed to satisfy the evidentiary burden. On the other hand, the
"proceeds of crime" allegation under section 881(a)(6) requires the gov-
ernment to show that a "substantial connection exists between the prop-
erty to be forfeited and the criminal activity.""3 Here, there was no evi-
129. 861 F.2d 868 (5th Cir. 1988).
130. Id. at 869.
131. Id. at 871.
132. Id. (citing Edelin v. United States, 227 A.2d 395, 398-99 (D.C. App. 1967) ("If this
substance cannot be sold, if it cannot be administered or dispensed, common sense dictates
that it is not such a narcotic as contemplated by Congress to be a danger to society, the
possession of which is proscribed.")).
133. Id. at 869-70.
134. Id. at 870-71.
135. Id. at 871-72.
136. Id. at 872. The legislative history of section 881 is devoid of any mention of the
"substantial connection" test. H. Rep. No. 1444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1970 U.S.
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dence that tainted assets had been used to purchase the plane.
Significantly, the court chose to impose a substantial connection require-
ment with respect to the "proceeds of crime" allegation, while both RICO
and the Comprehensive Drug Abuse and Prevention Act were primarily
designed to attack such a requirement.
Finally, with regard to the Title 19 count, the "illegal introduction"
allegation, the amount of cocaine found was so negligible that it did not
even constitute an "article which is introduced into the United States." '
One possible reason for the inconsistent standards is that "proceeds of
crime," such as money, are easier to trace directly to illegal drug traffick-
ing, at least easier then real estate or automobiles. At this date, however,
the courts have given no rationale for the differing treatment of property.
Although it demonstrates some rather strained statutory construction,
One Gates Learjet shows that facilitation is a legal concept whose mean-
ing should be decided by the court. Despite the seemingly discriminating
approach to facilitation jurisprudence in One Gates Learjet and despite
the doubt cast upon the validity of the "in any manner" test by cases like
United States v. $364,960.00 in United States Currency,18 the opinion in
1964 Beechcraft Baron Aircraft seems to exemplify the current Fifth Cir-
cuit position on facilitation.
The Sixth Circuit, which supports the "in any manner" test, 39 reiter-
ates the disagreement among the circuits as to whether the "substantial
connection" standard should apply. 40 This circuit considers itself bound
by the decision in United States v. One 1975 Mercedes 280S."" The
court's position in 1975 Mercedes 280S is similar to Fifth Circuit analysis.
As stated in One Gates Learjet and 1964 Beechcraft Baron, all the gov-
ernment needs to prove is that the narcoband was used or was intended
to be used "in any manner" in connection with the illegal drug
operation.'42
The defendant in 1975 Mercedes 280S, Patricia Glenn, telephoned a
man at a local pawn shop to ask if she could come by the shop because
she needed "one, ah, you know. . . a small one." Police observed Glenn's
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4566.
137. One Gates Learjet, 861 F.2d at 873.
138. 661 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1981). Recent Fifth Circuit cases indicate a swing away from
the "in any manner" test. In United States v. $24,000.00 in U.S. Currency, the court held
that government must show that there is probable cause for a belief that a "substantial
connection exists between the property to be forfeited and the criminal activity defined by
the statute." 722 F. Supp. 1386, 1389 (N.D. Miss. 1989) (quoting United States v. $38,600.00
in U.S. Currency, 784 F.2d 694, 697 (5th Cir. 1986)).
139. See United States v. One 1984 Cadillac, 888 F.2d 1133 (6th Cir. 1989).
140. Id. at 1136.
141. 590 F.2d 196, 199 (6th Cir. 1979).
142. 1964 Beechcraft Baron, 691 F.2d 725, 727 (5th Cir. 1982).
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car in the parking lot of the pawn shop. Later Glenn left the shop, got in
her car and drove away. No evidence of drugs was found in the car but an
undercover informant at the pawn shop indicated that he had sold drugs
to Glenn on more than one occasion.143 Even if it applied the "substantial
connection" standard, the court stated that this evidence was sufficient to
establish probable cause to believe a "substantial connection" existed . 4'
The car had been used "in any manner" to facilitate a drug deal at the
pawn shop. 4 5
Meanwhile, the Seventh Circuit had suggested that circumstances in
which property was "used repeatedly" in the course of a conspiracy, re-
quiring proof of the existence of a connection between assets and the ille-
gal enterprise, might be sufficient to satisfy the facilitation require-
ment. 4 6 However, the court expressly rejected a substantial connection
standard and adopted an "in any manner" standard in United States v.
One Parcel of Real Estate Commonly Known as 916 Douglas Avenue,
Elgin, Illinois.47 Undercover agent John Mueller spoke with defendant
Born about the purchase and sale of kilogram quantities of cocaine.
Mueller called Born at home and explained that he was out of cocaine.
Born agreed to sell Mueller the drugs for $3,200. To arrange a rendezvous
for the deal, the next morning Mueller again called Born, but another
man, Mazzanti, answered. Later that day, Mazzanti called Mueller him-
self and arranged to deliver the drugs that night. According to Mazzanti,
this delivery was Born's way of "feeling out Mueller to make sure he was
legitimate.' ' 4 1 Mazzanti explained to Mueller that if he ever needed more
cocaine, he should give Born a call at home. In opposition to the district
court's order of forfeiture, Born claimed that because no substantial con-
nection existed between the cocaine and his property the order of forfei-
ture was improper.
49
"The language of the statute is clear, straightforward and unambigu-
ous," wrote Chief Judge Bauer 50 In 916 Douglas Avenue, the Seventh
Circuit explicitly rejected the "substantial connection" test:
Grafting an implied "substantial connection" test on to the plain language
of [section 881] would not avoid ambiguity or the frustration of the Con-
gressional scheme, but promote them. We see no reason to read the penal-
143. One 1975 Mercedes 280S, 590 F.2d at 199.
144. Id. at 199-200. See United States v. One 1985 Chevrolet Corvette, 1990 WL 134711
(6th Cir. 1990) (government satisfied burden of showing facilitation where at the time of
arrest defendant was in the automobile, had $4,700.00 cash and .167 grams residue of co-
caine on his person, despite evidence that drugs could have come from another source).
145. One 1975 Mercedes 280S, 590 F.2d at 200.
146. See United States v. Nelson, 851 F.2d 976, 981 (7th Cir. 1988).
147. 903 F.2d 490 (7th Cir. 1990).
148. Id. at 493.
149. Id. at 491.
150. Id. at 492.
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ties of this statute more narrowly than the plain language demands ....
[A]lthough the Fourth Circuit has adopted a "substantial connection" test,
the differences between this approach and our own appear largely to be se-
mantic rather than practical. . . . [T]he distinction between a "substantial
connection" test and the "in any manner, or part" language offered directly
in the statute is blurry at best. We believe the more principled and direct
approach, and the one demanded by the plain wording of the statute itself,
is to affirm forfeiture of any real estate that is used in any manner or part
to commit or facilitate the commission of a drug related offense. 15 1
Applying this "in any manner" standard, the court limited its inquiry to
whether the connection between the underlying drug transaction and the
defendant's property was "more than incidental or fortuitous. '152 Predict-
ably, the court held that the connection was sufficient.
Although some recent district court opinions follow this "more than in-
cidental or fortuitous" language,'153 an Illinois federal district court has
rejected this approach to facilitation jurisprudence. In United States v.
8848 South Commercial Street, Chicago, Illinois,'5 4 the court stated that
the government must prove at the outset "that there was reasonable
grounds to believe that a substantial connection exists between the prop-
erty to be forfeited and the criminal activity.' 1 55 Oklahoma,' New Mex-
ico, 57 and Nevada, 5 8 seem to follow the "in any manner" approach of the
Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits. 59
151. Id. at 493-94 (emphasis added).
152. Id.
153. See, e.g., United States v. Certain Real Property, 747 F. Supp. 505, 515 (E.D. Wis.
1990) ("more than incidental or fortuitous" connection exists where search of residence
reveals highly sophisticated marijuana growing operations, and the presence of marijuana).
154. 1990 WL 139137 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 14, 1990).
155. Id. (emphasis added). In 8848 S. Commercial St., the police seized 47.91 grams of
marijuana and 5.9 grams of cocaine from an upstairs bedroom apartment and 2.91 grams of
marijuana and 5.16 grams of cocaine from a downstairs tavern. There were also four drug-
related arrests made on the property.
156. In re Forfeiture of a 1977 Chevrolet Pickup, 734 P.2d 693 (Okla. Ct. App. 1987)
(used to violate "in any manner).
157. In re Forfeiture of a 1982 Ford Bronco, 100 N.M. 577, 673 P.2d 1310 (1983) ("in any
manner" to transport-need not be for purpose of sale).
158. Nevada courts will order forfeiture of any property that is used "in any manner" to
facilitate a drug deal; but use of the property must be related to the "sale" of a controlled
substance. One 1978 Chevrolet Van v. Churchill County ex rel. Banovich, 97 Nev. 510, 634
P.2d 1208 (1981). Other cases from Nevada suggest that the state accords with the D.C. and
Federal Circuits. One 1977 Porsche 911S v. Washoe County, State of Nevada ex rel. Washoe
County Sheriff's Dept. Consol. Narcotics, 100 Nev. 210, 678 P.2d 1150 (1984).
159. But see In re Forfeiture of $5,264, 432 Mich. 242, -, 439 N.W.2d 246, 255 (1989)




5. "Delivery and Subsequent Distribution" Analysis
Carving out a more limited definition of uses, the Tenth Circuit empha-
sizes "substantial connection" and the role of the property in the delivery
and subsequent distribution of drugs. Although the Tenth Circuit has not
squarely addressed the issue, cases decided in its district courts suggest
that its rule would be more narrow than the "in any manner" test.
In United States v. One 1987 Ford F-350 4x4 Pickup,'160 the Federal
District Court of Kansas, found that the truck "in some manner" facili-
tated the sale or possession of a controlled substance. The truck was
"substantially connected to the intended purchase and possession of
marijuana."' 6'
In this case, a meeting set up by undercover DEA agents to purchase
500 pounds of marijuana took place at the Holidome in Manhattan, Kan-
sas. The deal was later closed at a hotel. The defendants drove a pickup
truck to the Holidome and then to the hotel. "[T]he government con-
tends the pickup was used to facilitate the sale or possession of a con-
trolled substance and forfeiture is warranted., 2 No money or marijuana
was ever transported in the truck.1 3 After reviewing the split among the
circuits, the court ruled in favor of the government because there were
"reasonable grounds" to believe use of the truck made "the possession
and purchase of marijuana less difficult."' 6 4 Because it facilitated the
drug deal in this manner, the truck was subject to forfeiture.'6 The court
concluded: "[i]f the law requires a 'substantial connection' to drug activ-
ity, that test is met on the facts."' 6 Thus, this court's interpretation of
"substantial connection" required a showing that the property facilitated
the delivery and subsequent distribution of the drugs.
In United States v. Harris, ' 7 the Tenth Circuit found that the govern-
ment satisfied the sufficient nexus test of the criminal forfeiture provi-
sion 68 upon seizure from defendant's truck of a silver metal box contain-
ing nineteen marijuana cigarettes, rolling papers, roach clips, newspapers
from Virginia, and motel receipts from Tennessee and Virginia. The court
found that $413,493 in currency found in the truck was intended to be
used to facilitate drug dealing and was forfeited.
69
160. 739 F. Supp. 554 (D. Kan. 1990).
161. Id. at 559 (emphasis added).
162. Id. at 557.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 559.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. 903 F.2d 770 (10th Cir. 1990).
168. 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(2).
169. Id. at 773, 777.
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The Tenth Circuit standard with its apparent "delivery and subsequent
distribution" component is narrower than the "in any manner" test, and
pushes the Tenth Circuit's forfeiture jurisprudence further into the "sub-
stantial connection" realm.
6. "Aggregate of Facts" Test
The Ninth Circuit requires an even greater "connection" between the
narcoband and illegal drug activity. The "totality of the circumstances"
approach to determine a standard for facilitation, demonstrated in Fifth
Circuit opinions,170 basically mirrors the path taken by the Ninth Cir-
cuit.1 7 ' The "aggregate of facts" test imposes an even narrower scope of
use than the Tenth Circuit's "delivery-subsequent distribution" standard
because no single fact can stand alone to show facilitation. Rather, the
court looks for a combination of facts. The facilitation element, as a re-
sult, has received markedly different treatment in those courts following
the Ninth Circuit approach.
In United States v. Padilla,72 the Ninth Circuit applied an "aggregate
of facts" test to find probable cause for forfeiture.173 The presence or ab-
sence of a single fact is not dispositive of the case, as it might be in the
Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth or Eleventh Circuits. Unless the "aggregate
of facts" demonstrates that property was exchanged or was intended to
be exchanged for drugs, it must be released from forfeiture. 4 The facts
must indicate "more than the mere existence of a large amount of cash to
establish a connection between that cash and illegal drug transac-
tions. .. ."175 To this end, the narcoband must be in "combination" with
other persuasive evidence of drug activity.'76 The property must be con-
nected or "linked" to the drugs. 7 7 In United States v. One Parcel of Real
Property,7 1 the Ninth Circuit intimated that it would hold the govern-
170. See One Gates Learjet, 861 F.2d 868 (5th Cir. 1988).
171. See United States v. $93,685.61 in U.S. Currency, 730 F.2d 571, 572 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied sub nom., Willis v. United States, 469 U.S. 831 (1984).
172. 888 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1989).
173. Id. at 643 (citing United States v. $5,644,540.00 in U.S. Currency, 799 F.2d 1357,
1363 (9th Cir. 1986)).
174. Id.
175. Id. at 644.
176. See $93,685.61 in U.S. Currency, 730 F.2d at 572; see also United States v. One
Parcel of Real Property, 904 F.2d 487 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. $22,287.00 in U.S.
Currency, 709 F.2d 442 (6th Cir. 1983) (money, heroin, powder scales, guns, found in search
after drug sale arrests); United States v. $83,500.00 in U.S. Currency and $40.00 in Canadian
Currency, 671 F.2d 293 (8th Cir. 1982) (money found at scene of drug sale).
177. Padilla, 888 F.2dat 645.
178. 904 F.2d 487 (9th Cir. 1990) rev'g on other grounds, 712 F. Supp. 810 (D. Or. 1989).
Although the Ninth Circuit in reversing the district court did not address the "substantial
connection" issue, it noted that the district court's rejection of the "substantial connection"
test probably was appropriate. Id. at 940 n.1.
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ment to the "aggregate of facts" standard. 17 9 The Texas Supreme Court'8 0
and Texas Court of Appeals,'181 likewise, support the "aggregate of facts"
standard.
7. "Antecedent Relationship" Test
Although the First Circuit has seemingly demanded a higher level of
scrutiny in civil forfeiture cases requiring not only must the use of the
property be an "integral part" of the drug transaction, but also that "an-
tecedent relationship" between the property and the drug deal exist-the
recent decision in United States v. A Parcel of Land with a Building
Located Thereon'81 suggests some movement toward the Eighth Circuit's
de minimis test. Following the rule set out in United States v. Premises
Known as 3629-2nd Street N.E.,' s 3 the court stated that "[florfeiture has
been enforced for truly de minimis infractions."' 4 The defendant's illegal
activity plainly was more than de minimis, which made application of the
de minimis test in A Parcel of Land easy. 8 5 The majority of cases, never-
theless, follow the narrower "integral party" and "antecedent relation-
ship" standard.
179. The district court held that delivery of cocaine to Caywood in the defendant's prop-
erty (a home) was sufficient to support forfeiture. 712 F. Supp. at 813. The court's decision
turned not only on the "delivery" of drugs but also on Caywood's repeated visits to the
residence for the purpose of obtaining cocaine, together with the fact that after the visits to
the property Caywood always distributed cocaine to the informant. Id. The decision of the
district court was reversed on grounds other than facilitation analysis. The Ninth Circuit
held that a triable issue of fact existed on whether the delivery of cocaine took place at an
auto parts store or at the defendant's residence and reversed the district court's summary
judgment. Id. at 491, 492.
180. In a case where currency was located in the same bathroom cabinet as drugs, the
Texas Supreme Court specifically rejected the contention that the money was derived from
an illegal source, since mere circumstantial evidence prohibited a finding that there was a
connection between the money and an illegal drug transaction. $56,700 in U.S. Currency v.
State, 730 S.W.2d 659, 662 (Tex. 1987).
181. The Texas Court of Appeals found that, where money was found locked in a safe
next to methamphetamine inside a house containing a methamphetamine laboratory in full
operation, there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to find that the money came from
illegal sales. However, without more evidence of the "link" between the drug business and
some nine millimeter automatic weapons and electronic equipment, the state failed to meet
its burden of proof to support forfeiture of the personal property. Barron v. State, 746
S.W.2d 528, 531 (Tex. App. 1988).
182. 884 F.2d 41 (1st Cir. 1989).
183. 869 F.2d 1093, 1096 (8th Cir. 1989).
184. A Parcel of Land, 884 F.2d at 45.
185. Id. at 44. The police seized from the property about eighty live marijuana plants,
and approximately fifty drying plants, as well as some marijuana seeds. According to the
evidence, defendants grew the marijuana in three separate fields located on the property.
They dried it on a "homemade" rack in the home, and stored the drugs both in the home
and in a shed located on the property. The court found that this was evidence of a "large-
scale, high-volume marijuana production operation, carried out on several segments of ap-
pellant's property." Id.
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Under this standard, not every involvement of narcoband with an ille-
gal drug transaction triggers forfeiture. In United States v. One 1972
Chevrolet Corvette,8 ' the defendant was found guilty of conspiracy and
possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance. His role in the
scheme was that of a banker. The only relationship the vehicle had to the
distribution scheme or plan was to transport the defendant to a certain
prearranged location, where he was supposed to receive payment of his
"front money. ' 187 The court fashioned the standard for the facilitation
concept by imposing two requirements: first, there must be an "antece-
dent relationship between the vehicle and the sale of narcotics" and sec-
ond, the transaction or meeting which the narcoband is alleged to "facili-
tate" must be an "integral part" of the illegal activity. s
The First Circuit recently reaffirmed this "antecedent relationship" ap-
proach to the facilitation element. In United States v. Parcel of Land &
Residence at 28 Emery Street, Merrimac, Massachusetts,89 the govern-
ment presented evidence of less than five grams of "white powder sub-
stance resembling cocaine," a plastic bag with "green vegetable matter,"
some marijuana cigarettes and butts, various drug paraphernalia, and nu-
merous weapons. The Court of Appeals held that there was a "lack of
solid evidentiary basis for linking the house to the sale of drugs." ' The
government failed to prove a sufficient connection between the narcoband
and the illegal drug activity.'9 '
8. "Sufficient Nexus" Test
The "sufficient nexus" test, expanded by the Second Circuit, draws a
fine distinction on the concept of what is an "integral part" of a drug
deal, suggesting other relationships may be sufficient to trigger forfeiture.
In comparison with the "integral part" component of the "antecedent re-
lationship" test, however, the standard in the Second Circuit appears to
be more generic and possibly less demanding.' 9'
186. 625 F.2d 1026 (1st Cir. 1980).
187. Id. at 1029. "Front money" is money put up before the drug deal is consummated.
188. Id. at 1029-30 (car not forfeited because it bore no antecedent relationship to the
sale of drugs).
189. 914 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1990).
190. Id. at 4.
191. Id. See also United States v. 141 Bell Rock St., 900 F.2d 470, 472 (1st. Cir. 1990).
192. According to the Second Circuit and the states of Colorado, California, New York,
New Jersey, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts, if the facts indicate that a vehicle was an
"integral part" of a drug selling conspiracy, and was involved in the transportation of a drug
dealer to the situs of a prearranged meeting or illegal transaction, where a sale of narcotics
is proposed or consummated, there is sufficient evidence to justify forfeiture. United States
v. One 1974 Eldorado Sedan, 548 F.2d 421, 423-25 (2d Cir. 1977).
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In United States v. One 1974 Cadillac Eldorado Sedan, the court re-
jected the "substantial connection" test.193 The court disagreed with such
a narrow construction of the forfeiture statute, but it also declined to fol-
low the de minimis or "in any manner" tests, criticizing them as "se-
vere." 19 4 The court settled on the notion that in order to be an "integral
part" of the drug conspiracy there must be some nexus between the
narcoband and the drugs, which forms a "sufficient basis" for
forfeiture.1'9
While the Second Circuit has never endorsed the "substantial connec-
tion" standard for the facilitation concept, it has come close. In 1989, the
court in United States, v. Property at 4492 South Livonia Road, Livonia,
New York 96 reinforced the requirement of a nexus between drugs and
narcoband forming a "sufficient basis" for forfeiture, as that phrase was
expressed in One 1974 Cadillac Eldorado Sedan.
In Property at 4492 South Livonia Road, the criminal defendant, Mey-
ering, retrieved drugs from the residence on two occasions and sold them
to an undercover informant. DEA agents seized from the residence the
following items:
[S]everal containers holding cocaine cutting agents and small quantities of
cocaine and marijuana; a triple beam balance scale; seven hand guns; a hand
grenade; an Uzi 9mm. carbine; and $19,000 in cash, of which nine $100 bills
were confirmed by serial match-up to have been given in the cocaine
purchases.19 7
On appeal from a judgment of forfeiture, the Second Circuit did not
require the government to "link" the property to a particular drug trans-
action. However, the court did require a showing that the property was
"sufficiently connected" with illegal narcotics activity. 98 Unclear is
whether simply being "integral" to the drug transaction satisfies the "suf-
ficient nexus" test, or whether in addition to being "integral" there must
be other contacts between the narcoband and the drugs, thereby raising
the connection to a "sufficient nexus." In any case, this "sufficient nexus"
test is the legal formulation of the facilitation concept in the Second Cir-
cuit.' 99 Recent cases from the district courts in this circuit underscore the
193. Id. (discussing United States v. One 1972 Datsun, 378 F. Supp. 1200, 1205 (D.N.H.
1974)).
194. Id. at 426.
195. Id. (a sufficient nexus was found and forfeiture was ordered where car was used to
transport the trafficker to the site of the drug deal).
196. 889 F.2d 1258 (2d Cir. 1989).
197. Id. at 1261.
198. Id. at 1269.
199. The Second Circuit recently upheld forfeiture of an entire apartment complex, even
though only some of the apartments in the building were used in connection with actual
drug dealing. United States v. 141st Str. Corp., 911 F.2d 870 (2d Cir. 1990).
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requirement of repeated illegal drug transactions.0 0 New York,"' New
Jersey,20 2 New Hampshire,0 3 and Massachusetts2' 4 have adopted the Sec-
200. See United States v. Certain Real Property & Premises Known as 38 Whalers Cove
Drive, Babylon, N.Y., 747 F. Supp. 173 (E.D.N.Y. 1990); United States v. $76,745,100.00 in
U.S. Currency, 1990 WL 129188 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 1990); United States v. All Right, Title
& Interest in Real Property & Appurtenances Known as 288-290 North St., Middleton,
N.Y., 743 F. Supp. 1068 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); United States v. All Right, Title & Interest in
Property & Premises Known as 710 Main St., Peekskill, N.Y., 744 F. Supp. 510 (S.D.N.Y.
1990); United States v. $175,260.00 in U.S. Currency, 741 F. Supp. 45 (E.D.N.Y. 1990).
201. In Vergari v. Lockhart, 144 Misc. 2d 86, 545 N.Y.S.2d 223 (1989), the court held that
defendant's possession of narcotics alone, would not support forfeiture of money. From the
defendant, police seized a bag of cocaine, $110.00 in cash, and a piece of paper with names
and numbers totalling $7,296.00. Scales were found on the premises, together with grinders,
spoons, andnumerous clear plastic bags, as well as $24,350.00 in cash, a weapon, and more
sheets of paper with names and numbers on them. Under these circumstances, the govern-
ment established a common scheme or plan of criminal activity involving the use of the
property to traffick in narcotics. In addition, the court held that it was necessary to find that
the property "contributes directly and materially" to the crime. Id. at -, 545 N.Y.S.2d at
228. This language seems to echo the "integral part" component of the Second Circuit.
In Property Clerk, New York City Police Dept. v. Aponte, 141 Misc. 2d 129, 532 N.Y.S.2d
1000 (1988), rev'd, 158 A.D.2d 431, 552 N.Y.S.2d 118 (1990), an automobile used to drive to
and from the situs of purchase, and in which heroin was purchased, was not subject to
forfeiture according to the supreme court. The facts were too attenuated to support the
requisite nexus for forfeiture. However, the appellate division reversed, holding that the
evidence adequately proved a "sufficient nexus" between the vehicle and the illegal drug
transaction. The appellate division upheld forfeiture "where [Aponte] was seen driving away
in his vehicle from the scene of the transaction, and a post-arrest search uncovered the
presence of contraband." 158 A.D.2d 431, -, 552 N.Y.S.2d 118, 119 (1990).
202. New Jersey courts have also found that lack of a "sufficient nexus" between money
and illegal activity will release the narcoband from forfeiture. State v. One 1978 Ford Van,
218 N.J. Super. 374, 527 A.2d 935 (1987). The "integral part" language, prominent in Sec-
ond Circuit decisions, has led state courts within the circuit to refer to ties of causality or
dependency, representing varying degrees of proximity in the relationship between the
property and the illegal drug transaction. See State v. One 1979 Chevrolet Camaro Z28, 202
N.J. Super. 222, 494 A.2d 816 (1985).
203. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire has held that its state forfeiture statute is
devoid of any requirement to prove a "connection" with a specific illegal transaction.
$270,523.46 in U.S. Currency, 130 N.H. 202, 536 A.2d 1270 (1987). The court was faced with
a statute which simply required proof that money was "used or intended for use" in viola-
tion of the controlled drug act. Where a large quantity of money was found in proximity to
drugs, along with records of drug transactions, implements used to prepare cocaine for sale,
and books on money laundering, the evidence was sufficient to justify forfeiture of the
money.
204. In Massachusetts, money found at six locations in a residence from which 103
pounds of marijuana was also seized was not subject to forfeiture because there was no
evidence that the homeowners had been involved in selling marijuana or were conducting an
ongoing drug business. There were no ledger books, packaging materials or safety deposit
box keys. No sales of marijuana by the homeowners had been observed by investigating
officers, nor had any undercover purchases been arranged so that there would be identifiable
funds among monies seized. The defendants, not surprisingly, contended that the entire
amount of the marijuana was for personal use. The Supreme Court of Massachusetts ruled
that the evidence was insufficient to establish the requisite nexus for forfeiture. Common-
wealth v. Seven Thousand Two Hundred Forty-Six Dollars, 404 Mass. 763, 537 N.E.2d 144
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ond Circuit definition of facilitation.
9. "Substantial Connection" Test
The last of the nine standards is the narrowest. "Substantial connec-
tion" draws an unbroken line from the property to the core of the drug
deal. The standard is articulated in United States v. Premises Known as
2639 Meetinghouse Road,05 which stated that when property is said to be
used to "further" the illegal trafficking in narcotics, the government has
the initial burden of proof of showing that a "substantial connection" ex-
ists between the property to be forfeited and the criminal activity. In this
case, DEA officials interviewed five cooperating witnesses who indicated
that the defendants, Leiby and Sebzda, had invested proceeds from their
methamphetamine drug trade in various bars, including the bar located
at 2639 Meetinghouse Road. These informants stated that Sebzda's sole
source of income was the drug trade, which the defendant admitted in a
taped confession.208 After reviewing the corporate records, DEA agents
concluded that Leiby also had insufficient income from legitimate sources
to have made cash payments for the purchase of the bar. The property
was placed in forfeiture under section 881(a)(6) of the federal statute.207
However, the landmark "substantial connection" standard decision is
United Stats v. Certain Lots in Virginia Beach.08 In this case, the only
"connection" between certain lots of real property located in Virginia
Beach, Virginia and illegal drug activity was a single transaction. An un-
dercover DEA agent met with defendant, Cole, at Cole's house. Cole
showed the agent twelve ounces of cocaine and packaged it at the agent's
request. He told the agent that he had just picked up the drugs and the
scale on his way home from work. The agent left the residence, returning
in an hour to pick up the cocaine. Both Cole and the agent then left the
residence. A subsequent search of Cole's house revealed "no cocaine."20 9
Unlike other courts addressing the facilitation concept, the court in
Certain Lots In Virginia Beach maintained "conformity to stare decisis
(1989).
205. 633 F. Supp. 979, 986 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (citing United States v. $55,518.05 in U.S.
Currency, 728 F.2d 192, 195 (3rd Cir. 1984); United States v. $64,000.00 in U.S. Currency,
722 F.2d 239, 244 (5th Cir. 1984)).
206. 2639 Meetinghouse Road, 633 F. Supp. at 985, 987 n.6.
207. Id. at 985; see also In re Forfeiture of $10,780.00 in U.S. Currency, 181 Mich. App.
761, 450 N.W.2d 93 (1989) (owner of money was trafficking in cocaine; his cash expenditures
were grossly disproportionate to his gross income, and he was unable to explain the source
of the excess funds).
208. 657 F. Supp. 1062 (E.D. Va. 1987) (cited by the Second, Third, Fifth, Eighth
Circuits).
209. Id. at 1063-64.
1990]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
and the legislative history. '210 Persuaded by the authority in United
States v. 1966 Beechcraft Aircraft Model King Air,2 1" the court held that
"real property may be subject to forfeiture only where there is a substan-
tial connection between the property and the underlying illegal
transaction.
'21 2
Although the district court agreed wholeheartedly with the rule of law
in 1966 Beechcraft, the court was puzzled by the 1966 Beechcraft analy-
sis, which declared that a plane that only transported conspirators to the
situs of the drug exchange had been used in "substantial connection."
The court said that 1966 Beechcraft was the "outer limits" of what could
be called "substantial." '21 3 The court went on to say, if "substantial"
means anything, it cannot be said that the connection between Cole's
house and the drug sale was "substantial." There was no evidence that
Cole "routinely" used the home to store, hide, or to distribute drugs.21 4
Applying similar analysis, the North Carolina Court of Appeals recently
held that forfeiture was justified where the state had shown that the
property was the location of a "pattern of racketeering activity."2 5 This
"pattern" requirement has also been utilized by an Alabama federal dis-
trict court.21 ' To these courts, this requirement of patterned and/or rou-
tine activity indicates a "substantial connection," which they believe is
necessary to justify forfeiture.
The Fourth Circuit, in two recent cases, reiterated the requirement
that property subject to forfeiture must be substantially connected with
drugs. In the case of United States v. One Parcel of Real Estate Located
at 7715 Betsy Bruce Lane, Summerfield, North Carolina,2 1 7 the govern-
ment discovered the following items: marijuana in a vase in the living
room of the defendant's house; a gram of cocaine in the defendant's car;
one bottle of Inositol (a common cutting agent for cocaine) in a bedroom
and another battle beneath the kitchen sink; and one set of triple beam
scales in the living room and another in the bedroom. The scales had
210. Id. at 1065.
211. 777 F.2d 947 (4th Cir. 1985). The 1966 Beechcraft court explained that Congress
intended that the civil forfeiture provisions of section 881 to permit forfeiture of property
only if a substantial connection exists between the property and the underlying criminal
activity. The airplane in 1966 Beechcraft transported the conspirators to the exchange site.
This established a "substantial connection" between the airplane and the drug transaction.
Id. at 953.
212. Certain Lots in Virginia Beach, 657 F. Supp. at 1065.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. State v. Tavern & Other Bldgs. & Lots at 1907 N. Main St., Kannapolis, N.C., 96
N.C. App. 84, 384 S.E.2d 585 (1989).
216. United States v. 60 Acres, More or Less, with Improvements Thereon, Located in
Etowack County, Ala., 727 F. Supp. 1414 (N.D. Ala. 1990).
217. 906 F.2d 110 (4th Cir. 1990).
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cocaine residue on them. Cocaine was present on trash, on the vanity, on
a briefcase and in a plastic bag inside the briefcase and at other locations
in the house. There was also testimony that the defendant had prepared,
packaged, consumed and distributed cocaine from the house.218 Applying
the "substantial connection" standard, the court held that the govern-
ment had proved that the defendant used the house to "facilitate" the
possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute.219
The court reached a similar result in United States v. Schifferli.22' The
court held that, under the "substantial connection" test, at a minimum
the narcoband must have more than an incidental or fortuitous connec-
tion to criminal activity.221 Dr. Schifferli used his dentist office to write
illegal prescriptions over forty times during a four month period. The
court found that the office was subject to forfeiture.2 12 Although the court
did hold the government to the "substantial connection" standard, it said
that just one use of the property may be enough to trigger forfeiture. In
Schifferli, and other like cases, where the property occupies a significant
role in the overall scheme of illegal drug activity, one use of the property
may indeed be enough to establish a "substantial connection." 7715 Betsy
Bruce Lane and Schifferli establish, however, that the strength of such
connection must be "substantial," which is a far greater evidentiary re-
quirement than is contemplated by the "in any manner" test.223
D. Virginia's Unique Legislative Standard
The Fourth Circuit and particularly the Commonwealth of Virginia
seem to be the fulcrum of the heightened "substantial connection" analy-
sis. Virginia is the only state where the words "substantial connection"
actually appear in its forfeiture statute. Section 18.2-249 of the Virginia
Code provides:
Seizure of property used in connection with or derived from illegal drug
transactions.-A. The following shall be subject to lawful seizure ... (i) all
money, medical equipment, office equipment, laboratory equipment, motor
vehicles, and all other personal and real property of any kind or character,
used in substantial connection with the illegal manufacture, sale or distri-
218. Id. at 112-13.
219. Id.; see also United States v. One Lot Jewelry, 749 F. Supp. 118 (W.D.N.C. 1990)
(substantial connection required). Under the federal scheme of drug enforcement, posses-
sion with the intent to distribute is a predicate to forfeiture, which, arguably, demonstrates
the grave concerns over the interstate trade in controlled substances. For a discussion of
Virginia's state forfeiture standard, see infra note 224 and accompanying text.
220. 895 F.2d 987 (4th Cir. 1990).
221. Id. at 990.
222. Id. at 991. The court also noted that the office "provided an air of legitimacy and
protection from outside scrutiny," which is reminiscent of the cover test for forfeiture. Id.
223. See also United States v. $95,945.18 in U.S. Currency, 913 F.2d 1106, 1110 (4th Cir.
1990) (forfeiture of money that was "clearly" involved with major drug transactions).
1990]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
bution of controlled substances . . . except real property shall not be sub-
ject to lawful seizure unless the minimum prescribed punishment for the
violation is a term of not less that five years; (ii) everything of value fur-
nished, or intended to be furnished, in exchange for a controlled
substance .... 224
Because there have been no cases defining "substantial connection" as
used in the Virginia statute and because there is no recorded legislative
history, the Fourth Circuit's judicially created "substantial connection"
standard might be applied by Virginia state courts. By legislatively call-
ing for the heightened burden of proof, Virginia is progressive in its ap-
proach to the facilitation element.
Definitions of facilitation range from broad to narrow, from simple to
complex, with esoteric gradations along the continuum. The wide range of
these definitions across the circuits illustrates an urgent need for a com-
mon, clearly expressed standard.
II. TOWARD A THEORY OF "SUBSTANTIAL CONNECTION"
In order to determine the appropriate legal meaning of facilitation in
civil forfeiture cases, courts should resort to the clear statements from
Congress contained in the specific language of section 881 and in the leg-
islative history, to traditional principles of statutory construction and to
precedent. Insufficient attention to these principles has led to the current
disagreement among the circuits over the facilitation clause of the civil
statute. The approach taken by the "substantial connection" jurisdic-
tions, a standard reflected in the Code of Virginia, is the most appropri-
ate in these civil forfeiture cases.
A. Congressional Intent
Congressional policy is often obvious on the face of the statute and
judges need not search far for the meaning of words or expressions.
Under these conditions, courts follow what is commonly called the "plain
meaning rule. '225 In Hutton v. Phillips, 226 the Delaware Supreme Court
provided a classic statement of this doctrine:
224. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-249 (Cum. Supp. 1990). Prior to this code amendment, seizures
were conducted pursuant to § 4-56 of the Virginia Code, which required only that the narco-
band be "connected" with the illegal manufacture, sale or distribution of a controlled sub-
stance; no substantial connected was required. The code limits seizure to the crimes of man-
ufacture, sale and distribution of controlled substances, proscribed by § 18.2-248. No
seizure, and thus no forfeiture may be instituted by the Commonwealth for possession of a
controlled substance with the intent to distribute, no matter the quantity.
225. See, e.g., Lake County v. Rollins, 130 U.S. 662, 670 (1889).
226. 45 Del. 156, 70 A.2d 15 (1949).
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[Judicial interpretation] involves far more than picking out dictionary defi-
nitions of words or expressions used. Consideration of the context and the
setting is indispensable properly to ascertain a meaning. In saying that a
verbal expression is plain or unambiguous, we mean little more than that we
are convinced that virtually anyone competent to understand it, and desir-
ing fairly and impartially to ascertain its signification, would attribute to
the expression in its context a meaning such as the one we derive, rather
than any other; and would consider any different meaning, by comparison,
strained, or far-fetched, or unusual, or unlikely.
. . . Implicit in the finding of a plain, clear meaning of an expression in
its context, is a finding that such meaning is rational and "makes sense" in
that context. 27
The United States Supreme Court presumes that unambiguous statu-
tory language expresses legislative purpose, making resort to legislative
history unnecessary.2 2  For example, in United States v. Rivera,229 the
Eleventh Circuit addressed the scope of "facilitation" under 21 U.S.C.
section 853-a criminal forfeiture statute-and found congressional in-
tent clearly expressed in the law's direction that provisions be "liberally
construed to effectuate its remedial purposes. '230 However, civil forfeiture
statutes such as section 881 do not have such clear directives for liberal
construction. Broad construction of facilitation under section 881 is fur-
ther limited only to "property interests" subject to RICO forfeiture.2 31
The United States Supreme Court has not indicated that a broad stan-
dard should apply to facilitation under section 881. Judicial construction
of civil forfeiture statutes, therefore, cannot rely on the guidance of plain
meaning, as can construction of criminal statutes.
1. Plain Meaning in 916 Douglas Avenue
In 916 Douglas Avenue, the Seventh Circuit decision wrote that
"[florfeiture is appropriate if the property is 'used, or intended to be
used, in any manner or part, to commit or to facilitate the commission' of
a drug offense. '232 Because the court found plain meaning in the language
of the statute, it saw no need to inquire into congressional intent. There
was no reason, the court asserted, to read the penalties of section 881
more narrowly than the plain language demanded. Moreover, the court in
916 Douglas Avenue noted that the distinctions between the narrow
227. Id. at 159, 70 A.2d at 17 (emphasis added).
228. See, e.g., American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68 (1982).
229. 884 F.2d 544 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1322 (1990).
230. Id. at 546 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 853(o) (Supp. IV 1987)) (emphasis added).
231. See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 27 (1983).
232. 903 F.2d 490, 492-93 (7th Cir. 1990) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1984)) (emphasis
added).
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"substantial connection" approach and the broad "in any manner" ap-
proach to the legal meaning of facilitation were "semantic," "blurry at
best."23 The court presumed that if narcoband has more than an inciden-
tal or fortuitous connection with drugs it has been used in "substantial
connection" and, therefore, it has facilitated a drug deal. 23 4
The court's analysis fails. It denies the possibility that in applying this
broad and rigid definition of "facilitate," an even lower threshold of activ-
ity might also render the consummation of the drug deal "less difficult," a
lower standard demonstrated, for instance, in the Fifth or Eleventh Cir-
cuits' cases. 23 5 Would this rigid definition lead courts to conclude simple
proof that narcoband made the drug deal "less difficult" is sufficient?
Second, instead of focusing narrowly on the "in any manner" qualifier,
courts' attention should be directed to the meaning of "facilitate" which
is the direct activity Congress sought to attack by enacting section 881.
Rigid adherence to the "in any manner" language may also be at odds
with the rule of construction requiring any ambiguities in a penal statute
to be resolved in favor of defendants.
In Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB,236 the United States Supreme
Court considered the "substantial evidence" formula in the context of the
Wagner Act.23 7 The sponsors of the legislation thought the words, "sub-
stantial evidence," were clear, but Justice Frankfurter noticed that "the
inevitably variant applications of the standard to conflicting evidence
soon brought contrariety of views and in due course bred criticism. ' 23 In
light of the competing interests of the litigants, subtle differences in the
opinions of judges about legal meaning should be tempered by reference
to the steady calculus of the congressional record. Frankfurter's com-
ments are illustrative. "However halting its progress, the trend in litiga-
tion is toward a rational inquiry into truth, in which the tribunal consid-
ers everything 'logically probative of some matter requiring to be
proved.' "1239
If the words of a statute are "clear" and "of plain meaning," the expec-
tation of a conflicting interpretation ought to be non-existent. Yet, the
Seventh Circuit explicitly mentioned an apparent "conflict" with the
Fourth Circuit on the facilitation issue. 240 The court, nevertheless, re-
233. Id. at 494.
234. Id.
235. See supra notes 89-104 and accompanying text and notes 123-28 and accompanying
text.
236. 340 U.S. 474 (1950).
237. 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 160(e)).
238. Id. at 497.
239. Id. (quoting Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371 (1933); J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY
TREATISE ON EVIDENCE, 530 (1896)).
240. 916 Douglas Ave., 903 F.2d at 493-94.
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solved the conflict by avoiding statements of congressional intent in its
sweeping application of "plain meaning."'241 By side-stepping analysis of
legislative history, the court necessarily misses those arguments support-
ing the "substantial connection" test.
2. Psychotropic Substances Act
2 42
These arguments supporting the "substantial connection" standard,
however, are not found in original congressional statements concerning
the intended scope of the facilitation clauses of section 881.243 Courts
must look to the language of related later statutes to find clear state-
ments of the intended meaning of facilitation.2 44 The joint explanatory
statement of the Psychotropic Substances Act of 1978 notes: "Due to the
penal nature of forfeiture statutes, it is the intent of these provisions that
property would be forfeited only if there is a substantial connection be-
tween the property and the underlying criminal activity which the statute
seeks to prevent. '245 Nothing contained in the Psychotropic Substances
Act suggests that Congress contemplated an unlimited forfeiture power
for the federal government. The phrase, "these provisions," appears to
refer to the statutory forfeiture provisions of section 881 as a whole and
should be taken as a deliberate guide to its language. In resolving the
dispute between the circuits over whether the "used in any manner to
facilitate" language may reach narcoband used only to transport conspir-
ators to the situs of a drug transaction, the court in United States v. 1966
Beechcraft Aircraft Model King Air,246 was persuaded by the "substantial
connection" instruction contained in the legislative history. The First,247
Second,248 Third,249 Fourth, 250 Fifth,251 Sixth,252 Eighth,253 and Elev-
241. See id. at 494.
242. Psychotropic Substances Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-633, 92 Stat. 3768 (codified at
21 U.S.C. §§ 352, 801 note, 801(a) 802, 811, 812, 823, 827, 830, 841-43, 852, 872, 881, 952-53,
965); Pub. L. No. 96-359, 94 Stat. 1194 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 830, 841-43
(1980)).
243. United States v. One 1972 Chevrolet Corvette, 625 F.2d 1026, 1029 (1st Cir. 1980).
244. See id.
245. 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADaMIN. NEws 9518, 9522 (emphasis added).
246. 777 F.2d 947, 953 (4th Cir. 1985).
247. See One 1972 Chevrolet Corvette, 625 F.2d 1026.
248. See United States v. Property at 4492 S. Livonia Rd., Livonia, N.Y., 889 F.2d 1258,
1269 (2d Cir. 1989) (citing, United States v. 1974 Cadillac Eldorado, 575 F.2d 344, 345 (2d
Cir. 1978)); United States v. One 1974 Cadillac Eldorado Sedan, 548 F.2d 421, 423 (2d Cir.
1977).
249. See United States v. $55,518.05 in U.S. Currency, 728 F.2d 192 (3rd Cir. 1983).
250. See 1966 Beechcraft Aircraft, 777 F.2d at 953; United States v. Certain Lots in Va.
Beach, 657 F. Supp. 1062 (E.D. Va. 1987).
251. See United States v. $321,470.00 in U.S. Currency, 874 F.2d 298, 306 (5th Cir. 1989).
252. See United States v. 526 Liscum Drive, Dayton, Montgomery County, Ohio, 866 F.2d
213, 216 (6th Cir. 1989); United States v. One 1984 Cadillac, 888 F.2d 1133, 1138 (6th Cir.
1989); United States v. Premises Known as 8584 Old Brownsville Rd., Shelby County,
Tenn., 736 F.2d 1129, 1131 (6th Cir. 1984).
253. See United States v. Premises Known as 3639-2nd St., N.E., Minneapolis, Minn., 869
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enth254 Circuits explicitly acknowledged this historical language as an ex-
pression of congressional intent in the forfeiture context.255 The Eighth
Circuit, for instance, in United States v. One 1976 Ford F-150 Pickup,25
quoted congressional statements from the Psychotropic Substances Act,
which supported its holding that narcoband must be "substantially asso-
ciated" with the manufacture of marijuana. The court stated: "[W]e do
not believe that the forfeiture statute was meant to support divestiture of
private property based on an insubstantial connection between the vehi-
cle and the illegal activity ... .
As shown, courts give the proper high regard for congressional intent.
However, the courts need to focus on all applicable congressional intent,
which is found not only in section 881, but also in related forfeiture provi-
sions such as the Psychotropic Substances Act. Even though section 881
was "designed to enhance the use of forfeiture," Congress explicitly indi-
cated its desire to keep this powerful weapon on a leash.258
3. "Indispensability" Requirement
The court in United States v. Certain Lots in Virginia Beach259 quoted
at length from the Senate Report accompanying the proposed 1984
amendments to 21 U.S.C. section 881:
Under current law, if a person uses a boat or a car to transport narcotics or
uses equipment to manufacture dangerous drugs, his use of the property
renders it subject to civil forfeiture. But if he uses a secluded barn to store
tons of marijuana or uses his house as a manufacturing laboratory for am-
phetamines, there is no provision to subject his real property to civil forfei-
ture, even though its use was indispensable to the commission of a major
drug offense and the prospect of the forfeiture of the property would have
been a powerful deterrent.6 0
The inference of this statement is clear. While, on the one hand, the legis-
lative history did not indicate that the narcoband must be "indispensable
F.2d 1093, 1096-97 (8th Cir. 1989); United States v. One 1976 Ford F-150 Pick-Up, 769 F.2d
525, 527 (8th Cir. 1985).
254. See United States v. One 1979 Porsche Coupe, 709 F.2d 1424 (11th Cir. 1983).
255. While acknowledging "substantial connection" as the touchstone of forfeiture, the
courts differ in their interpretation of the language. See supra notes 83-223 and accompany-
ing text.
256. 769 F.2d at 527.
257. Id. at 527 (emphasis added).
258. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 191, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3374.
259. 657 F. Supp. 1062 (E.D. Va. 1987).
260. Id. at 1065 (quoting S. RaP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 195, reprinted in 1984
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3182, 3378) (emphasis added).
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to the commission of a major drug offense," on the other hand, Congress
did not intend civil forfeiture to apply to property which has only a fortu-
itous or incidental connection with criminal activity involving drugs.21
The district court in Certain Lots in Virginia Beach interpreted "indis-
pensable" to mean "substantial connection. '282
The Second Circuit interpreted "indispensable" in a similar way. In
United States v. One 1974 Cadillac Eldorado Sedan,2e3 the court stated:
The nabobs of the drug business normally eschew physical custody of dope,
relegating to their minions possession of the brown paper bag .... If the
purpose of the [forfeiture] statute is, as Congress indicated, to reduce the
profits of those who practice this nefarious profession, we are loathe [sic] to
make the forfeiture depend upon the accident of whether dope is physically
present in the vehicle.
26
Whether Congress intended its statement about "indispensability" to
be considered as a forfeiture standard is unclear. The First and Second
Circuits' requirement that the narcoband be an "integral part" of the
drug deal is similar to the "indispensable" language. The integral part
test outlined in United States v. One 1972 Chevrolet Corvette,"5 is con-
sistent with a congressional mandate for a "substantial connection." On
the continuum of facilitation, courts may place "substantial connection"
between "indispensability" and "integral part." Moreover, Congress' ref-
erences to "indispensability" should not necessarily be read to limit the
substantive element of facilitation. Rather, references to "indispensabil-
ity" not only appear directed toward the nature of property subject to
forfeiture, as seen in Russello v. United States,26' but also the use of the
narcoband.
"Indispensable" in the Senate Report may apply specifically to the
type of conduct which subjects the narcoband to forfeiture. The "use" of
the boat or car may be "indispensable" to the transportation or manufac-
ture of dangerous drugs, not specifically "indispensable" to the drug deal
itself. If the illegal drug activity could have been accomplished by any
means, or at any location, the narcoband may be released from forfeiture
261. Certain Lots in Virginia Beach, 657 F. Supp. at 1065; 916 Douglas Ave., 903 F.2d at
493.
262. Id. at 1065. The United States District Court for Minnesota reached the same con-
clusion holding that one drug sale at a house did not constitute "substantial connection."
However, the Eighth Circuit reversed finding that there was a "substantial connection."
United States v. $12,585.00, 669 F. Supp. 939, 943 (D. Minn. 1987), rev'd, No. 87-5449 (8th
Cir. Mar. 10, 1989), reh'g denied, 869 F.2d 1093 (1989).
263. 548 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1977).
264. Id. at 426. (emphasis added). See also United States v. One 1979 Lincoln Continen-
tal, 574 F. Supp. 156, 159-60 (N.D. Ohio 1983), aff'd, 754 F.2d 376 (6th Cir. 1984).
265. 625 F.2d 1026, 1029-30 (1st Cir. 1980).
266. 464 U.S. 16, 20 (1983).
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because use of that specific means or situs was not "indispensable. '26 7
The legislative history of the Contraband Seizure and Forfeiture Act2 68
illustrates congressional concern with the rising international drug trade
and drug trafficking in this country. The House Report accompanying 49
U.S.C. section 781 reflects this concern:
Enforcement officers of the government have found that one of the best
ways to strike at commercialized crime is through the pocketbook of the
criminals who engage in it. Vessels, vehicles, and aircraft may be termed the
operating tools of dope peddlers, and often represent major capital invest-
ments . . .Seizure and forfeiture of these means of transportation provide
an effective brake on the traffic in narcotic drugs. 69
Adherence to the requirement of indispensability comports with congres-
sional statements about combatting the trade in illegal narcotics yet does
not produce harsh forfeitures at every turn. In some exceptional cases,
the notion of "indispensability" may require that the government prove
the property was not only "substantially connected" to an illegal drug
transaction, but also was "indispensable" to a drug deal itself. Where a
single use of the property may be sufficient to trigger section 881, the
connection between the narcoband and the illegal drug transaction must
be greater.7 0 Courts in these cases look for significant and critical con-
tacts. Just one use of the property may indeed be sufficient to subject it
to forfeiture, but the significance of such a connection is that it must be
"indispensable."
While no court has yet suggested that "substantial" does not mean "in-
dispensable," "substantial connection" is a slightly less rigorous burden.
While Congress addressed the issue of "indispensability" in the legislative
history of the Psychotropic Substances Act, some courts have interpreted
the facilitation standard as requiring a "substantial connection." Because
the common law does not favor forfeitures, they should only be enforced
within the letter of the law.2 ' However, "substantial connection" a more
viable and effective standard than the "indispensable" standard an-
nounced by Congress. Under an "indispensable" standard, few forfeitures
would result because of the incredibly strong connection required be-
tween the property and the drug activity. While defendants' property
267. See Platt v. United States, 163 F.2d 165, 167 (10th Cir. 1947) (automobile used to
make a drug deal released from forfeiture; "ease or difficulty of the purchase would have
been the same no matter how [the defendant] got there").
268. 49 U.S.C. § 781 (1982).
269. H. REP. No. 2751, 81ST CONG., 2D SESS. (1950), reprinted in 1950 U.S. CODE CONG.
SERV. 2952, 2953-54 (emphasis added).
270. See United States v. Schifferli, 895 F.2d 987 (4th Cir. 1990) (substantial connection
between office building and its use by dentist in connection with writing of illegal prescrip-
tions justifies forfeiture of property); see also supra notes 220-23 and accompanying text.
271. United States v. One Ford Coach, 307 U.S. 219, 226 (1939).
208 [Vol. 25:171
SUBSTANTIAL CONNECTION
would be shielded, this result would not further the purpose of forfeiture
to reduce drug trafficking. The "substantial connection" standard, on the
other hand, is a sufficiently demanding standard that ensures forfeitures
will not be rampant, yet also ensures forfeitures will occur when there is a
sufficiently strong and justifiable connection between the property and
the illegal drug activity. Even under vigorous attack by its critics, the
"substantial connection" standard survives as the best answer to the legal
question presented by section 881 forfeitures.
4. Criticism of Psychotropic Substances Act Language
Few courts have specifically rejected the "substantial connection" stan-
dard. 272 The Second, Fifth and Seventh Circuits do not agree to such a
"narrow" construction of the forfeiture statute, although the Second Cir-
cuit does embrace a more exacting "sufficient nexus-integral part" test.
27 3
In United States v. 1964 Beechcraft Baron Aircraft,27' the court relied
heavily upon the absence of "substantial connection" language in the leg-
islative history279 in determining that "the 'substantial connection' stan-
dard does not apply to § 881(a)(4). ' '27' Although congressional statements
in the history of the Psychotropic Substances Act made no explicit men-
tion of using the "substantial connection" test for other provisions of the
forfeiture statute,7 surely this language was not intended to be so se-
verely limited to section 881(a)(6) cases. The mere absence of specific
statutory language ought not be interpreted as conclusive evidence of leg-
islative intent.27 8 Because Congress intended to expand the scope of prop-
erty forfeitable beyond conveyances through the Psychotropic Substances
Act, its standard of "substantial connection" should apply to all
"forfeitables." The "text of the law, the starting point of analysis, must
not be taken in a vacuum. '279 When courts insist that specific references
to "substantial connection" in the legislative history are fixed and unal-
terable, they ignore the tradition of judicial construction of statutes.
Given that the Psychotropic Substances Act is a vital part of the histori-
cal context of the federal civil forfeiture scheme, the rejection of "sub-
stantial connection" and adoption of the "in any manner" test takes the
272. See, e.g., United States v. 1964 Beechcraft Baron Aircraft, 691 F.2d 725 (5th Cir.
1982) (interpreting § 881[a][4]), cert. denied sub nom. Preston v. United States, 461 U.S.
914 (1983)); see also supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text.
273. See supra notes 192-204 and accompanying text.
274. 691 F.2d 725 (5th Cir. 1982).
275. See generally Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention & Control Act, H. REP. No.
1444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 4566.
276. 1964 Beechcraft Baron, 691 F.2d at 727.
277. 691 F.2d 725, 727 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub nom., Preston v. United States,
461 U.S. 914 (1983).
278. Cf. I SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 27 (4th ed. 1985).
279. Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 748 (D.D.C. 1971).
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meaning of facilitation out of the larger context.
Judicial consideration of the "substantial connection" standard pre-
dates the Psychotropic Substances Act. Before 1978, courts discussed the
appropriateness of the heightened "substantial connection" requirement.
In 1977, the Second Circuit debated the notion of "facilitation" in United
States v. One 1974 Cadillac Eldorado Sedan.280 After analyzing the "sub-
stantial connection" cases, the court settled upon the "sufficient nexus"
test. The court indicated emphatically that this "sufficient nexus" inter-
pretation of the statutory language "used in any manner to facilitate"
comported with the "language and intent of section 881(a)(4). ' '281 These
pre-1978 statements of congressional intent suggest that courts perceived
a clear message from the statute and that the proper legal standard for
facilitation is greater than "in any manner."
5. The Aponte Case
The New York case of Property Clerk, New York City Police Depart-
ment v. Aponte2 82 suggests another reason why courts mistakenly reject
the "substantial connection" standard. The court stated: "The use of the
words 'in any manner' in [the federal] statute, and the absence of the
'substantial connection' language. . . demonstrates a congressional intent
to have the [federal] statute apply to a more extensive range of activity
[than state forfeiture statutes.] 2 83 Aponte suggests that the clear absence
of specific "substantial connection" language in the federal statute justi-
fies a "liberal" view of the facilitation element. However, the Aponte de-
cision has limited application. Aponte addresses the construction of state
forfeiture statutes, not federal statutes. Aponte could be interpreted to
mean that, in the absence of the "in any manner" language in state forfei-
ture statutes, state courts are bound to construe the meaning of facilita-
tion in state civil forfeiture proceedings more narrowly than the federal
courts. Aponte further suggests that application of the federal standard
to determine when narcoband will forfeit for violations of state law is
inappropriate.
The absence of "substantial connection" language, moreover, should
not automatically lead courts to conclude that the legislature did not in-
tend for that standard to apply. The Michigan Court of Appeals in Peo-
ple v. 2850 Ewing Road,284 interpreted the legislative intent of a statute
which "closely" parallels the federal civil forfeiture statute and stated:
Nothing in this statute indicates a legislative intent that the situs of a drug
280. 548 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1977).
281. Id. at 423 (emphasis added).
282. 158 A.D.2d 431, 552 N.Y.S.2d 118 (1990).
283. Id. at 432, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 119.
284. 161 Mich. App. 266, 409 N.W.2d 800, appeal denied, 429 Mich. 884 (1987).
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transaction is subject to forfeiture merely because it is the situs. Had the
Legislature intended a house to be subject to forfeiture if an illegal drug
transaction occurs within the house, it could have clearly stated so.285
Similarly, nothing in the federal forfeiture statutes indicates a congres-
sional intent that narcoband should forfeit merely because it bears "some
relationship" to an illegal drug transaction, including situs, transporta-
tion, or proceeds. Congress sought to address the quality of this "relation-
ship" in enacting the civil forfeiture statute. Congress could have clearly
defined facilitation in the body of the statute by subjecting to forfeiture
any property where a drug transaction occurs, any property that trans-
ports a person to the arrangement or consummation of a drug deal, or any
property that provides camouflage for a drug deal. Congress did not do
this, however,
Section 932.703(1) of The Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act is an ex-
ample of a clear statutory indication of legislative intent. "In any incident
in which possession of any contraband article .. .constitutes a felony,
the vessel, motor vehicle, aircraft, or personal property in or on which
such contraband article is located at the time of seizure shall be contra-
band subject to forfeiture. '" 286 The Florida statute clearly defines the re-
quired connection between the drugs and the narcoband: a felony amount
of contraband found in or on the property at the time of seizure triggers
forfeiture.
The South Dakota legislature, in the face of repeated judicial decisions
releasing narcoband from civil forfeiture,2 7 amended its statute to in-
clude the following provision: "This subdivision includes those instances
in which a conveyance transports, possesses or conceals marijuana or a
controlled substance . . . without the necessity of showing that the con-
veyance is specifically being used to . . facilitate the transporta-
tion. .... ,,28s Prior to the amendment, the Supreme Court of South Da-
kota held that facilitation required "more than mere transportation of an
amount of drugs for personal use."289
Congress chose not to enact such a clearly delineated statute as some
states of have done. The absence of "substantial connection" language in
the statute, therefore, may also support the proposition that Congress in-
tended to define the facilitation concept as a "substantial connection" be-
tween the narcoband and the illicit drug activity. In this light, the "in any
manner" language is a mere qualifier. The federal statute may plausibly
285. Id. at 272, 409 N.W.2d at 802.
286. State v. Crenshaw, 548 So. 2d 223, 224-25 (Fla. 1989) (quoting FL& STAT. ANN. §
932.703(1) (West 1985 Cum. Supp. 1991) (emphasis added)).
287. See, e.g., State v. One 1972 Lincoln Continental, 295 N.W.2d 343 (S.D. 1980).
288. S.D. CODIFMD LAWS ANN. § 34-20B-70(4) (1989).
289. One 1972 Lincoln Continental, 295 N.W.2d at 347.
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be read to state that narcoband is subject to forfeiture only if it has been
used "in any manner" in substantial connection with an illegal drug
transaction. Against the backdrop of the legislative history, this interpre-
tation is an acceptable way of reading the statute. Furthermore, applica-
tion of the doctrines of noscitur a sociis and in pari materia seems to
negate any inference that the mere absence of the words "substantial con-
nection" from the body of the statute automatically requires the court to
fashion a liberal definition of the "facilitation" element.
6. Connotation
Noscitur a sociis means a definition can be found by connotation from
surrounding or accompanying phrases.2 90 The meaning of the phrase
"used in any manner to facilitate" can be determined from this method of
statutory construction. The requirements of "probable cause,"'29' the so-
called "innocent owner" exceptions,2"2 the "stay" provisions293 in section
881, all point to the conclusion that Congress intended private property
owners to be constitutionally protected from imprudent prosecution.
These same sorts of guarantees are found in criminal forfeiture statutes,
which also have bona fide purchaser exceptions.29"
The Ninth Circuit expressed heightened concern about potential fifth
amendment "takings" problems in the "innocent owner" context.2 95 Simi-
larly, the Michigan legislature specifically declared that unsuspecting par-
ties have a security interest in real property subject to forfeiture.26 In
particular, the existence of the "innocent owner" and "stay" provisions of
section 881, strongly suggests that Congress had the same constitutional
concerns in mind when it drafted the facilitation language. A constitu-
tional analysis would support a greater threshold of connection than
would be required by the "in any manner" test. "The 'substantial connec-
tion' test . . . strikes the proper balance between the rights of the indi-
vidual property owners and the state's need to use the weapon of forfei-
ture in its war on wholesale drug dealing.' ' 297 This balancing of interests
inherent in the mechanics of civil forfeiture statutes supports the "sub-
stantial connection" standard.
290. For a discussion of the rule, see R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION
OF STATUTES 233 (1975); see also Gleason v. Thaw, 236 U.S. 558 (1915).
291. 21 U.S.C. § 881(b) (Cum. Supp. 1989).
292. 21 U.S.C. §§ 881(a)(4)(B), (a)(7) (Cum. Supp. 1989).
293. 21 U.S.C. § 881(i) (Cum. Supp. 1989).
294. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1988).
295. See Gaudry v. United States, 893 F.2d 1096 (9th Cir. 1990).
296. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.15-7521(1)(f), 7523(3) (Callaghan 1989).




Just as judicial faithfulness to the canon of noscitur a sociis invites
courts to adopt the "substantial connection" standard, the maxim of in
pari materia suggests an equally persuasive reason for a strict definition
of the facilitation element. s Statutes upon the same subject matter or
relating to a common purpose should be construed together. 99 References
to other civil forfeiture statutes support this general rule. The United
States Supreme Court in United States v. Lane Motor Co. 3 0 0 interpreted
language similar to section 881's "used to facilitate" in section 3116 of the
1939 Internal Revenue Code, although section 3116's language was
broader than that of section 881.301 The Court held that "a vehicle used
solely for commuting to an illegal distillery is not used in violating the
revenue laws. 302
The Ninth Circuit, in Simpson v. United States,303 interpreted the
meaning of 26 U.S.C. section 7302, which provides for the seizure of "any
property intended for use in violating the provisions of the internal reve-
nue laws." 304 Justice Merrill wrote that "an automobile used only for the
personal convenience of the owner as transportation to the site of the
illicit operation is not subject to seizure. '30 5 The Lane Motor Co. and
Simpson cases support the proposition that only property which is "in-
dispensable" to the drug deal should be subject to forfeiture. The New
Hampshire federal district court, in United States v. One 1972 Datsun,306
drew upon the language in these tax statutes to support the rule that "to
be forfeited [under section 881], a vehicle must have some substantial
connection to . . . the underlying activity which the statute seeks to pre-
vent."307 The language in the internal revenue statutes appears to require
that the government show a "substantial connection" in section 881 cases,
because the courts interpreted words practically identical to section 881.
Indisputably, all civil forfeiture statutes share two public policy goals
underlying criminal statutes.30 8 The first goal is the separation of the drug
dealer from his ill-gotten gains, and the second is the erosion of the eco-
298. For a discussion of the rule, see R. DICKERSON, THEINTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION
OF STATUTES, 233 (1975).
299. Undercofler v. L.C. Robinson & Sons, Inc., 111 Ga. App. 411, -, 141 S.E.2d 847, 849
(1965).
300. 344 U.S. 630 (1953).
301. The section allowed forfeiture of property "intended for use in violating" the alcohol
tax laws, as well as property "which has been so used." Id. at 630.
302. Id. at 630-31 (emphasis in original).
303. 272 F.2d 229 (9th Cir. 1959).
304. Id. at 231.
305. Id.
306. 378 F.2d 1200 (D.N.H. 1974).
307. Id. at 1206.
308. United States v. $152,160.00 in U.S. Currency, 680 F. Supp. 354, 356 (D. Colo. 1988).
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nomic base of the drug trade.30 9 Because forfeiture statutes share a com-
monality of subject matter and purpose, the individual provisions of sec-
tion 881 and other federal and state statutes should be interpreted in
pari materia. Proper construction of the statute requires a uniform inter-
pretation of these common features. Therefore, if Congress clearly enun-
ciates that the "substantial connection" test should be applied to "pro-
ceeds of crime," the same phrase used in other parts of section 881 should
receive the same construction.
8. Considerations of Equity
Most courts recognize that not every involvement of narcoband with an
illegal drug transaction should trigger forfeiture.3 10 When the penalty is
disproportionate to any loss which could possibly accrue to the state as a
result of the owner's illegal drug activity, notions of inequity arise.31' Be-
cause forfeiture of narcoband is a harsh remedy under any circumstance,
equity dictates that a greater amount of harmful contact is needed in or-
der for the forfeiture to be justified. An equitable test for facilitation
analysis would forestall some of the unjust consequences resulting from
zero tolerance programs. For example, in one case, a court ordered the
defendant's vehicle to be forfeited after police seized .226 grams of mari-
juana from a plastic bag found in the trunk.3 12 The court speculated that
"it was likely the matter constituted the remains of a larger quantity of
marijuana, especially in light of its location in the vehicle. '313 In another
case, a twenty-eight foot yacht was forfeited to the United States after
two leaves and a twig of marijuana were found stuck in a crevice of a
board in a compartment underneath the gasoline tank, and the bilge
water tested positive for marijuana.3 1 4 Based upon the assumption that
only a few drug dealers are ever caught, however, the equitable principle
of proportionality competes with the notion that only disproportionate
action on the part of the government can deter.
One answer to this argument is that disproportionate risks ought to be
prohibited by the eighth amendment. 15 On remand from the Second Cir-
309. See United States v. One 1974 Cadillac Eldorado Sedan, 548 F.2d. 421 (2d Cir. 1977).
310. See Humphery v. Humphery, 254 Ala. 395, 48 So. 2d 424 (1950); Kay v. Kay, 188
Cal. App. 2d 214, 10 Cal. Rptr. 196 (1961); Roshek Realty Co. v. Roshek Bros. Co., 249 Iowa
349, 87 N.W.2d 8 (1957); Roth Dev. Co. v. A.R. John Gen. Contractor, Inc., 263 Or. 561, 503
P.2d 493 (1972).
311. Cf. Fifty States Management Corp. v. Pioneer Auto Parks, 46 N.Y.2d 573, 389
N.E.2d 113, 415 N.Y.S.2d 800 (1979).
312. United States v. One 1976 Porsche 911S, 670 F.2d 810, 812 (9th Cir. 1979).
313. Id.
314. United States v. One 1982 28 Foot Int'l Vessel, 741 F.2d 1319, 1320 (11th Cir. 1984).
315. Some courts have been reluctant to apply the eighth amendment to civil forfeiture
proceedings. See, e.g., United States v. Santaro, 866 F.2d 1538 (4th Cir. 1989); see also Com-
monwealth v. One 1986 Ford Mustang, - Pa. -, 579 A.2d 958, 960 (1990) (relationship
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cuit, the district court in United States v. Regan3 1 declared the $17.8
million asset forfeiture sought from four officers of the Princeton/New-
port Partners violative of the excessive fines and cruel and unusual pun-
ishment clauses of the eighth amendment.3 1 7 Judge Carter became the
first jurist in history to vacate forfeitures on constitutional grounds.
B. Statutory Construction
The Texas case of Barron v. State318 succinctly states the common law
rule for construction of civil forfeiture statutes. "A [civil] forfeiture stat-
ute should be read in such a way as to effectuate the intent of the Legisla-
ture while at the same time, if reasonably possible, to prevent rather than
cause a forfeiture."3 9
Remedial acts of Congress, which "supply defects" and "abridge super-
fluities" in the law, generally are given liberal construction.3 20 Certain
well-established barriers to this general application, however, do exist.
Courts deem remedial statutes which operate retrospectively to abrogate
pre-existing property rights to be destructive in nature.32 1 Relation-back
provisions, prevalent in forfeiture statutes since feudal times, impair
vested, pre-existing property rights acquired by statute and the common
law. This impairment mandates strict construction.
A number of recent decisions from the Iowa Supreme Court indicate a
willingness to judicially apply strict construction and limit the police
powers of the state to seize narcoband. In one case, the court ruled that
police cannot seize "legitimately acquired" homes which are used in the
commission of a crime.322 In Kaster v. State, the court considered
whether misdemeanor violations of Iowa's game and fish laws, gave rise to
forfeiture of the boat.3 23 The court decided that the term "facilitate" in
Iowa Code section 809.1 required a "substantial connection between the
property and the crime. "324
Civil forfeiture statutes, in addition, are both remedial and penal. Since
the penal purpose of a civil forfeiture statute cannot be separated from
between amount of drugs and value of narcoband is immaterial).
316. 699 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
317. Sontag, Princeton/Newport Case: RICO Stretched Too Far?, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 20,
1989, at 3.
318. 746 S.W.2d 528 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988).
319. Id. at 530 (citing Sheppard v. Avery, 89 Tex. 301, _, 34 S.W. 440, 442 (1896).
320. Kuriansky v. Bed-Stay Health Care Corp., 135 A.D.2d 160, 525 N.Y.S.2d 225 (1988).
See generally E. CRAWFORD, CONSTRUCTrON oF STATuTEs 492-93 (1940).
321. Ex parte Buckley, 53 Ala. 42 (1875).
322. See Forfeitures Rejected, Nat'l L.J., June 11, 1990, at 6 (no cite given in article).
323. 454 N.W.2d 876, 877. Kaster used a gill net to catch three fish which police found in
his boat. Id.
324. Id. at 879.
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its remedial counterpart, 3 5 and since a penalty against the rights of prop-
erty owners will be involved in every case, the distinction between penal
and remedial has become blurred. The Tenth Circuit in United States v.
$39,000.00 in Canadian Currency expressed "grave concern" about sepa-
rating a person from his property in "anticipation" of formal criminal
proceedings.3 26
Remedial statutes in derogation of the common law, moreover, should
be strictly construed.32 7 Although there is a strong common law tradition
of civil forfeiture in this country, civil forfeiture statutes, like section 881,
nevertheless, abrogate common law rights of free transfer and devise, or
other alienation, by interfering with and encumbering a private property
owner's power to freely dispose of his property. For these reasons, the
United States Supreme Court has declared that forfeiture statutes must
be strictly construed.3 28
C. Doctrine of Lenity
Strict rules of construction are given their pragmatic life in the form of
the doctrine of lenity. Congress never recorded its views on the legal
meaning of facilitation in drug felony civil forfeiture cases. The current
debate between the "in any manner" jurisdictions ahd the "substantial
connection" jurisdictions illustrates the ambiguity caused by Congress'
failure to speak. Multiple interpretations of the facilitation standard are
undesirable in jurisprudence.
The Eleventh Circuit's opinion in United States v. Rivera 329 points to a
solution for the problem of ambiguity in civil forfeiture statutes, a solu-
tion closely aligned with traditional canons of strict construction and len-
ity. To save his quarter horses, the defendant, Burgess, attempted to
draw on the doctrine of lenity as it was announced in United States v.
Enmons.3 3 0 In Enmons, the United States Supreme Court, reviewed a
government appeal in a case involving alleged Hobbs Act violations. 3 1
Justice Stewart explained that as the Hobbs Act was "a criminal statute,
it must be strictly construed, and any ambiguity must be resolved in
favor of lenity." ' 2 Three reasons why the Enmons principle of strict con-
325. See United States v. $39,000.00 in Canadian Currency, 801 F.2d 1210, 1218 (10th Cir.
1986).
326. Id. at 1219 n.7.
327. CRAWFORD, supra note 320, at 495.
328. United States v. One 1936 Model Ford, 307 U.S. 219 (1939).
329. 884 F.2d 544 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1322 (1990).
330. 410 U.S. 396 (1972).
331. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
332. Enmons, 410 U.S. at 396 (citing United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat) 76,
95 (1820); United States v. Halseth, 342 U.S. 277, 280 (1951); Bell v. United States, 349 U.S.
81, 83 (1955); Arroyo v. United States, 359 U.S. 419, 424 (1959); Rewis v. United States, 401
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struction is applicable to lenity include:
[1] The court will not extend the law beyond its meaning to take care of a
broader legislative purpose;
[2] The court will resolve an evenly balanced uncertainty of meaning in
favor of a criminal defendant, the common law, the "common right," a tax-
payer, or sovereignty;
[3] Where the manifest purpose of the statute, as collaterally revealed, is
narrower than its express meaning, the court will restrict application of the
statute to its narrower purpose."'
The rule of lenity is applicable only when no clear legislative directive
exists.33 4 Thus, in the absence of a "clearly expressed legislative intent"
statutory language must not be regarded as conclusive.3 3 5 The rule of len-
ity is applicable to all statutes that are criminal in nature. In Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez,3 3 6 the United States Supreme Court enumerated the
tests traditionally applied to determine whether a statute is penal:
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether
it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it comes into
play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will promote the
traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence, whether the be-
havior to which it applies is already a crime, whether an alternative purpose
to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it
appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned .... 37
Interpreting the "penalties" section of the Federal Firearms Act,33 8 the
United States Supreme Court in United States v. One Assortment of 89
Firearms,339 acknowledged that actions giving rise to forfeiture proceed-
ings are criminal in nature. The Fourth Circuit explicitly stated that the
punitive aspects of civil forfeiture are "self-evident. ' ' 34 0 In People v. Chi-
cago,34 1 the Illinois Supreme Court treated the subject in a quasi-consti-
tutional sense. The court held that a statute which creates the right to
exercise a police power deserves strict construction with reasonable doubt
resolved against the state. Civil forfeiture statutes are sufficiently puni-
tive that they should be construed in favor of the property owner. The
real disagreement among the circuits concerns the proper amount of con-
U.S. 808, 812 (1970)).
333. R DICKEasON, THE INTERPRETATION & APPLICATION OF STATUTES 206 (1975).
334. Rivera, 884 F.2d at 546.
335. See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 20 (1983).
336. 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963).
337. Id. at 168-69.
338. 18 U.S.C. § 924(d) (Cum. Supp. 1989).
339. 465 U.S. 354, 365-66 (1983).
340. United States v. Santoro, 866 F.2d 1538, 1543 (4th Cir. 1989).
341. 261 Il. 16, 103 N.E. 609 (1913).
1990]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
tacts between the narcoband and the drugs.
The current debate should be resolved in accordance with the doctrine
of lenity. The Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Rivera42 did not sub-
scribe to a narrow reading of section 853 because of the obvious congres-
sional intent expressed by section 853(o). The Second Circuit in United
States v. One 1974 Cadillac Eldorado Sedan,3 43 however, characterized
the "substantial connection" standard as a narrow or strict construction
of the civil forfeiture statute. Similarly, the New Hampshire Supreme
Court in re $270,523.46 in United States Currency,344 held the govern-
ment to a stricter "sufficient nexus" test. Especially when meaning is in
doubt, civil forfeiture statutes should be construed most heavily against
the government and in favor of the private property owner. Lenity re-
quires a definition that would resolve the action in favor of the defendant.
Such a strict construction calls for application of the "substantial connec-
tion" test.
The need to impose upon the government a heightened "substantial
connection" standard for the facilitation concept is motivated'as much by
elementary concerns about proper judicial action and the principle of len-
ity, as it is by statements of clear congressional intent in the legislative
history. Recognition of the "substantial connection" requirement is sup-
ported by reference to established principles of statutory construction,
such as noscitur a sociis and in pari materia. "Substantial connection" is
the optimal answer to the question of the appropriate meaning of facili-
tate in civil forfeiture actions. No other standard is as well supported by
the law. Powerful reasons for applying the "substantial connection" test
to civil forfeiture cases also come from the common law. In tandem with
congressional intent and statutory construction, precedent must be part
of judicial interpretation of the facilitation element. A pattern is discern-
ible within the decisions of a great majority of circuits and states, includ-
ing jurisdictions that purportedly adopt the "in any manner" test. Cer-
tain patterns of behavior justify forfeiture of narcoband. Courts have
focused their discussion on words such as "routine," "repeated," "regu-
lar," and "delivery," and they have used phrases such as "ongoing drug
business," "common scheme or plan," "length of association," "antece-
dent relationship," "multiple items of evidence," "combination of other
persuasive evidence," "subsequent distribution," "integral significant or
critical part" in the "overall" scheme of things. This level of analysis sug-
gests an elective affinity with the "substantial connection" standard. The
notion of property has always been sacred in this country. The strength
of that value is supported by'the "substantial connection" standard for
facilitation.
342. 884 F.2d 544, 546 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1322 (1990).
343. 548 F.2d 421, 423 (2d. Cir. 1977).
344. 130 N.H. 202, 536 A.2d 1270 (1987).
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A recent case from the Eleventh Circuit illustrates how courts would
analyze "substantial connection" under the proposed definition. In
United States v. Approximately 50 Acres of Real Property,4 5 the de-
fendants never used the property as a delivery or storage site for a spe-
cific drug deal.34 6 The evidence indicated, however, that the property was
used to negotiate and plan an essential component of a specific drug
transaction that actually took place. The conspirators met regularly on
the property and discussed the details of their schemes. They traveled
from a house on the land to inspect a proposed aircraft landing site for
importation of cocaine.3 47  The government proved a substantial
connection.
III. CONCLUSION
In the war against drugs, a balance must be struck between the guilty
and the innocent. That balance can be achieved through a requirement
that the government show a "substantial connection" between property
to be forfeited and illegal drug business. A proposed draft for model jury
instructions for the Commonwealth of Virginia gives a definition of "sub-
stantial connection" as the routine, repeated, and intentional use of the
narcoband to conduct the illegal manufacture, sale, distribution of a con-
trolled substance. This definition accords with Fourth Circuit case law
and with precedent from other jurisdictions.
This definition synthesizes the approaches taken by a majority of the
circuits into one fair, uniform and concise standard, which ensures that
the federal government will not be able to take advantage of venue laws
to increase its chances of succeeding in a forfeiture action. It recognizes
that narcoband which is merely "suspected" of being in "substantial con-
nection" with illegal drug activity should be released from forfeiture. Ac-
tual "substantial connection" between the property and illegal activity
must be shown. A careful examination of the legislative history, principles
of statutory construction, and precedent strongly supports "substantial
connection" as the correct standard for defining the facilitation element
in civil forfeiture cases.
Steven S. Biss
345. 920 F.2d 900 (11th Cir. 1991).
346. Id. at 903.
347. Id.
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